The question invokes Husserl, for whom intentionality means something very different from the colloquial sense of the word; if we are using his definition, the following answer applies.
Husserl's "intentionality" is, roughly speaking, the capacity to represent. Saying that consciousness is intentional, therefore, only says that consciousness cannot be about nothing, nor is it somehow the literal thing itself.
Now, of course matter can be used to represent things: magnetic patterns on a hard disk, genes that represent receptor proteins that represent external cAMP concentration that represents likelihood of starvation, etc..
But Darwinian evolution is seen as not intentional in the colloquial sense. Evolutionists don't spend much time thinking about whether evolution has the capacity to represent things itself. Certainly the evolved things represent an awful lot, both molecularly and, in animals with a nervous system, via neurons. And the theory of evolution represents what actually goes on, so of course it is Husserl-intentional in that (not very interesting) sense also.
So, the theory of evolution and the output of evolutionary processes are Husserl-intentional, and that's not a problem at all. The problem, if any,
is with easily-confused terminology.
However, the question seems to be about the colloquial definition of intentionality; if so the following answer applies:
Because we cannot (presently, anyway) create consciousnesses with varying compositions, our formulations are necessarily mostly descriptive rather than prescriptive.
It is certainly the case that human consciousness is intentional, and indeed we find intention-like behavior (such as the coming together as a slug or eventual transformation into a fruiting body of the slime-mold Dictyostelium) in creatures that we generally do not wish to ascribe consciousness to.
So it seems relatively safe to say that human consciousness is intentional, and then we can leave it comfortably vague what we mean by "intentional" and "consciousness"; the truth or falsity of the claim will not hinge on small details of exactly what we mean.
The rest of the questions can just be read out from this underlying insight, if one takes a physicalist perspective. Those systems that display intentionality are made of matter, so yes, of course, under some circumstances matter can be intentional. Matter can also induce pressure, can flow with viscosity, can store funny cat GIFs, and do all sorts of other emergent or bulk tasks. The philosophically contentious claim, if any, is that there's nothing special about intention beyond what the properties of matter can cover. But that's what physicalists are committed to: there's nothing special about anything, whether it be qualia or intention or consciousness or anything else.
Indeed, that some matter can be conscious is irrelevant to the physicalist's stance on intention. Intention clearly happens, in some sense, and in those senses in which it does, it is necessarily physical. End of story! Consciousness need not make an appearance.
With regards to evolution, we need not concern ourselves with consciousness or intention. For some matter we can describe a pressure; for most we can describe a pressure. Does it follow that evolution has a pressure or a single temperature? Of course not! Those properties don't describe evolution, and so they are inappropriate to use. Likewise, there is no need to ascribe intention or consciousness to evolution. It is described plenty well enough on its own terms. Instead, you should proceed the other way around: decide on a sufficiently precise definition of intention and/or consciousness, and then see if evolution has the requisite properties. If you do not like the answer, maybe you got the definition wrong.
All of this is greatly complicated by the fact that we don't understand the biological (or computational!) basis of intention or consciousness very well at all. Usually "intent" implies some sort of underlying model of the external world, some sort of goal, and some sort of computation or thought process that acts upon the model to come closer to the goal (followed presumably by actions that make the real world more closely align with that model). Evolution doesn't do this. But then again, neither does Dictyostelium.
Evolution does run a kind of optimization algorithm, but unless you say that every optimization algorithm "intends" to perform its optimization, calling it intentional is quite a stretch. And, regardless, one needn't care about consciousness in order to decide whether it's intentional or not.