Is there a cogent argument for whether there are objective moral facts?

Question

I just finished an introductory ethics course in college and we talked about different perspectives in metaethics.

We spent most time on realist vs anti-realist arguements and for my purposes here let's just define the sole differences between these two groups are their world-view on the existence objective moral facts.

On one hand, realists argue that objective moral facts must exist because otherwise any moral argument can simplify to emotional expressions (i.e your sports team is bad and mine is good).

On the other anti-realists argue that objective moral facts imply quite a bit about our universe. For example, we talked about (Crito I think?) a story in which Aristotle basically said that there are two scenarios for why a good is "good".

Either because God defined it that way, and therefore it is arbitrary, or that it is outside of the God's control and therefore our beliefs about God is wrong. We didn't go into too much depth, but I was wondering if there was more to either side of this argument. And generally what do different schools say about objective ethics?

Answer 1

Short Answer: No.

Long Answer:

Think of a convincing argument. It would start from unobjectionable premises and then through unobjectionable chains of inferences proceed inexorably to an unobjectionable conclusion. Such a systematic treatment is so formalized, it could be checked (or even generated) by a machine.

In short, a rigorous argument that convinces all would be tantamount to a mathematical proof.

Now examine the structures of proofs. You either proceed from premises that all accept, or you make your proof hypothetical (i.e.: if these conditions hold, then such a conclusion must necessarily follow as shown by these steps).

Such proofs work because they demonstrate what "is".

Yet morality is about what "ought" to be. Can you even agree on an "ought"? What would your (unobjectionable) premises be?

This isn't to say there aren't arguments for morality or that these arguments may not convince some people. This is to say that such arguments would not have the force of a mathematical proof.

Now if you're willing to accept a weaker argument that proceeds on the hypothetical (assuming X holds, then Y must follow) then you could provide an argument that all would agree would hold in a world in which the premises are true, but this doesn't mean they'd agree they hold in our world.

Answer 2

There are a number of positions that advocate for the existence of objective moral facts. This is typically called 'moral realism', and is a conjunction of a number of claims:

1. Moral claims are truth-apt.
2. Moral claims are objective.
3. There are at least some true moral claims.
4. We can know what these true moral claims are.

We'll focus on 1 and 2. 1 amounts to the claim that non-cognitivism is false: whatever moral claims are, they aren't merely expressions of emotion. Rather, moral claims are on a par with scientific or mathematical claims insofar as they purport to describe some feature of the world - specifically, the moral features. Moral claims are true when they accurately represent the moral facts, and they are false when they don't. The important bit is that they can be true or false at all. So, for instance, the claim that 'sufferring is bad' is not an expression of my or anyone else's emotions or feelings - it is an expression of a fact.

On to 2. Something is true objectively if it is true independent of anyone's thoughts, feelings, beliefs or ideas about that thing. Something is true subjectively if it is not true objectively, i.e. if its truth depends on what people think, feel, believe etc. about it. So 2 says that the truth-values of moral claims do not depend on what anyone thinks, or feels, or believes about them. So, for instance, if it is true that suffering is bad, then it is not because people believe that suffering is bad, or think that it is bad, or feel that it is bad. (More carefully: is that it is not merely because they think, feel, or believe that suffering is bad that it is bad).

3 entails the falsity of error theories, and 4 ensures that moral agents aren't isolated from the moral facts - they're not outside of the domain of things that we can know at all.

So, that is the core of moral realism. It can be fleshed out in other ways as well. If moral realism is true we might ask what kind of facts are moral facts. Are they natural facts, or non-natural facts?

Now, what cogent arguments there are for moral realism will depend on the kind of moral realism you accept. If you're a moral non-naturalist, then Moore and Huemer give compelling cases for their view. Their arguments will typically take the following form: (i) they'll offer up a prima facie plausible example of a moral fact, for instance, 'torturing innocent babies just for fun is wrong'. (ii) they'll claim that any argument which implies the falsity of 'torturing innocent babies just for fun is wrong' will be less prima facie plausible than the truth of the fact that torturing babies just for fun is wrong. (iii) from (i) and (ii) they'll argue that moral realism is correct.

Different arguments exist for the different flavours of realism (see below). The point, however, is that there are cogent arguments for moral realism, and they do deserve to be taken seriously.

Here are some links that can get you started:

http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/moral-realism/ http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/moral-anti-realism/ http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/moral-non-naturalism/ http://www.owl232.net/5.htm (this is a chapter from Huemer's book)

Answer 3

The first few chapters of CS Lewis's work Mere Christianity start by discussing why there is such a thing as an objective morality. I'm sure many would disagree with it, but it's a serious, thoughtful argument to be taken seriously by those who would disagree with its conclusions.

In summary, it goes something like this:

1. You get on a bus.
2. Right before you sit down, someone pushes you out of the way and takes your seat.
3. You react, "That's not fair!"
4. Your reaction appealing to fairness assumes there's a measure of fairness. If there isn't then, the person who stole your seat might not share the same as you, and appealing to a notion of fairness would be non-sense.
5. Therefore, there exists some notion of an objective moral right and wrong.

Answer 4

Yes, there is an objective basis for moral values but I believe such basis is spiritual not material or this-worldly. Here's my thesis:

Moral values stem from the higher domain of existence where all virtues and goodness are united in a non-composite whole. All acts or expressions of goodness and morality in the material domain emanate from their perfect form in this higher domain. However the essentially pluralistic, divisive nature of the material domain and its time-space restrictions both manifests and at the same times degrades, dissipates and obscures this transcendental perfect goodness. Mistaking this perfect transcendental goodness for its imperfect this-worldly manifestations is considered to be the cause of all moral vice/evil. Because such an illusion leads one to pursue goodness/virtue in sources other than the real transcendental source and through means other than the spiritual.

To better makes sense of the above philosophy, here's a concrete example: a poor person desires wealth for s/he sees many benefits in material possessions, e.g. physical comfort, better chance of marrying a beautiful/handsome partner, public respect etc. However such identification of goodness is an illusion. The illusion is in that physical comfort is only a degraded manifestation of spiritual peace; likewise human beauty is a only descended form of angelic spiritual beauty and public respect is only a this-worldly manifestation of God's majesty; and thus all the former sets of perceived goodness are subject to the limitations I mentioned in the first paragraph of my thesis.

While the pursuit of these lower this-worldly forms via this worldly means usually involve immoral sentiments (e.g. greed, selfishness and pride) – that in turn lead to such immoral practices as hoarding wealth, being stingy, stealing, fraud, demagogy, etc – leading to inflicting harm on others, pursuit of goodness by going to its real transcendental source, on the contrary, generates both personal and general good; for finding spiritual peace requires letting go off stressful preoccupation with material pursuits, attaining real original beauty (which would be similar to its transcendental source spiritual rather than material) requires establishing communion with the higher source via prayer and meditation which would on the contrary lead to humility, benevolence and charity rather than pride and selfishness etc. Thus the person not only acquires the real original goodness whose illusion the former had only tasted, but the society will also benefit from the external 'spill-over' of his/her internally realized goodness! Such is the objective root of goodness and morality!

The above thesis draws upon Plato's idea of Perfect Forms, Neo-platonic theory of Goodness and Intellectual Forms, and theistic view of goodness and morality.