Classically a truth value is asserted of a proposition: thus by its very nature it must be describable.

Jain Logic has a 'truth value' which is asserted to be true and indescribable; by the above it cannot be asserted of classical propositions.

So, what is it asserted of? I suppose, I'm asking what is the form of a Jain proposition.

Interestingly, assuming Kants metaphysics, one can say that the noumenon is (ontologically) true, in that it exists; but by Kants description, it is indescribable ie undifferentiated.

  • Does 'describable' have an accepted, er, description?
    – dwn
    Jan 21 '15 at 17:51
  • Oops, I see you compare it to the thing-in-itself later, so I get what you mean.
    – dwn
    Jan 21 '15 at 17:59
  • @dwn: sure; unfortunately in this kind of query things become paradoxical; to modify your query - isn't 'indescribable' a description; therefore paradoxical; therefore nonsensical; but this assumes a certain form of rationality; one can look at the Western tradition, where certain paradoxical statements are cast in a different language to give them a meaning with which one can work - Cantorian Set Theory as a (certain) description of the infinite; intuitionism as a repudiation of the LEM and so on. Jan 22 '15 at 10:27
  • What this means in terms of Jain Logic, is that one will have to excavate and discover their forms of reasoning; and what their reasoning was about - its aim. Jan 22 '15 at 10:27
  • 1
    Sorry, at the moment I don't have time to consider and respond to your comments in kind. Just want to note something that came to mind this morning: it seems there are a class of synthetic concepts determined by a single-value description: in calculus "becoming" is defined by a rate; in physics, a qubit can be described by a single weight.
    – dwn
    Jan 23 '15 at 14:53

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