Kripke formulated an argument against the identity theory (between mental and physical) which is similar in spirit to Chalmers' zombie argument, but he did not use philosophical zombies explicitely.
His argument is based on rigid designation (the fact that names are used, in natural languages, as if they were refering to essences, or necessary properties, possessed in every possible world) and the necessity of identity (if a is identical to b, it is so in every possible world).
He concludes that if pain were identical to a physical brain state, it would have to be necessary so, but it is perfectly conceivable that a feeling of pain exist without the corresponding brain state (or the converse). Therefore pain is not identical to a brain state.
The argument faces the same kind of objection than Chalmers', in particular: why should we infer metaphysical possibility from conceivability?
For more details, you can read this blog post https://arigiddesignator.wordpress.com/2011/02/17/kripkes-refutation-of-identity-theory/