[Made edits (*) to attempt to address comments]
You make other assertions which I will not address (not that they aren't worthwhile), but as I understand them, your main theses are...
(1) Today there is a divide between natural science and an influential portion of philosophy.
(2) This is not natural in terms of intellectual development; perceived past problems such as 'social Darwinism' and 'comparative phrenology' are being exploited.
(3) This is being done by a relatively few people who are able to influence philosophical discourse (and seem to be doing it fully intentionally, if I understand you right).
(4) Today there is a comparatively great amount of global inequality of capital and fulfillment.
(5) (1) is the primary cause for (4). (*)I misunderstood this.
First, let me say, it is an interesting argument, I think, as it goes straight to biology and the propagation of one's physical being as well as one's competent interaction within their environment, or at least straight to the study of such things; however, there are many things to be addressed. I've tried to note some I've noticed.
Regarding (1), there are new disciplines that have arisen in the nations mentioned that bridge the fields in some ways. For instance, ecological psychology attempts to understand human behavior as related to natural conditioning in natural environments (that way we can kill peasants on the other side of the world in the most effective way possible).
Regarding (2), I think you made a problematic statement here:
The role of biology - through ph[y]siology, ethology, evolution and mostly the view of diversity in natural populations - has been despised as useless, or even dangerous, from the point of view of many in the so-called "human sciences".
Firstly, these disciplines may have different reasons for their separation from philosophy, and it may simply be their own fault. Ethologists have made claims relating animal behavior to human behavior that did not pan out. It's an interesting discipline, but there is conjecture that sometimes emanates popularly (not that hypothesis is bad, but ethics is a deep study).
(*)Both in ancient and in recent times, 'reasons' for biology are somewhat apt to be offensive or wrong. I don't know that this is necessarily the case due to an alteration of the scientific method, but it seems a tendency in popular reading. I have heard Desmond Morris described as the man who thinks human women are shorter so they can get turned on smelling men's sweaty armpits. I love Desmond Morris, and this is certainly not a balanced representation of his work. Even stated in this contentious way, this very particular notion is not necessarily entirely wrong. Still, one can see how a scientist putting forward a notion like this could be perhaps rightly put to task. You mention ancient observers, which are sometimes almost definably wrong, such as Aristotle's notion of women as similar to castrated men, due to their higher pitched voices and certain other traits. Not that anything is invalid about the experience of a castrated man, but a statement such as this carries with it all kinds of notions. It detracts from the other great organic studies of Aristotle. Whether such popular ideas are prevalent for their shock value, or due to a concerted effort you describe is maybe hard to determine.
(*)Perhaps you are somewhat right concerning 'hyperidealism' making understanding one-dimensional in terms of Economics. I think this argument is problematic, though, because 'value' is determined by all sorts of factors in the non-ideal world, so of course economics is not an ideal. It crystallizes all sorts of bad ideas into a so-thought perfect form. Economics can describe goods shared by a community as well as an individual. It can weight factors against environmental exploitation. A value can be placed on many different types of 'independent' material properties, thus making it more than one-dimensional. In the sense that Economics places maximizing ownership of production for oneself a rational goal, I agree that the 'ideal' is not ideal.
Secondly, confusion exists in many disciplines. Look at the odd state physics is in. Perhaps physics is resting on a fundamental misunderstanding. Perhaps philosophy or natural science has experienced its own fundamental misunderstanding.
(*)Physics has split into multiple disciplines, and experiments often cost an exorbitant amount of money. In the year 1969, a person stood on the moon, string theory was stated, the first message on the ARPANet passed, the first laser printer made, the first back-propagated neural network run, the UNIX operating system developed. Five years before that, quark theory was proposed. Since that time, minaturization, usability, reproducibility, and maintenance have ruled the day, I'd argue. Physics cannot make predictions as well as it used to. (Whether such inventions were good is something else, but I think they index a general trend of physical application in at least the US.)
Thirdly, perhaps the problems have just gotten harder and therefore more difficult to apply. It takes specialized devices to study molecular biology. Much information may be accessed through databanks and papers, but making statements of the sort William James made in earlier days of physiology may be harder to evidence or understand.
(*)William James made statements concerning sensations as related to fundamental understandings and emotions. For an instance, to argue that humans can make sharp modal changes in perception, he described how a pendulum when hit at a certain frequency will swing in one pattern, then lock into another as the frequency is slowly adjusted. He compared this to the human auditory system, to sort of describe how humans can experience rhythm differently than pitch or timbre.
(*)The size of humans as compared to materials of interest has changed. Equipment is therefore necessary for physical observation, and it is costly. Perhaps the material properties that should be of interest should be different, or perhaps the interest should not be in materials, I dunno. Perhaps it should be in animals, or ourselves, or newly created materials, or old forgotten natural materials, or preservation of the Earth, or in metaphysics, or in story-telling, or in silly putty. Your propostition is that what controls interest and spread of ideas is control of capital, historical materialism (although I don't like the term, since it is really about control over certain kinds of material, not just materialism). I didn't realize that (5) was not your argument.
Fourthly, the connections may have been extended past their obvious limits. Regarding evolution, it is more difficult to agree on speciation of ideas than it is speciation of animal life.
Fifthly, it may be a natural occurrence. History has gone through periods of dissociation in understanding before, also great destruction in various areas. What is to be considered natural and unnatural today?
(*)The 'awful aversion of some scientists' has always existed. Partly, it is due to disagreement, partly it is due to ontological commitments and comfort/survival, partly it is due to personal conflicts. Darwin understood that deism, Lamarckism, and saltation were common intellectual understandings of his time. His wife implored him not to give up spiritual concerns. He of course had a famous debate with Owen. I think perhaps the danger is really that 'scientist' has lost its meaning. If you are arguing that 'scientists' are no longer scientists, then what you are really arguing is about the loss of science. You therefore believe science has broken down, and must be revitalized. What is your suggested solution?
Regarding (3), how are these people able to ignore experts while remaining empowered? How are they silencing anyone? How are they making a more effective appeal to the mass?
(*)How churches do this is a long and contentious answer I don't entirely know, and won't attempt to make. I'd guess Max Weber probably still reigns here.
Regarding (5), how is this to be understood as the cause and not the result?
I think my deepest contention, and perhaps this is just a personal thing, is that it has that negative outlook of Marxism. I fear that by investing oneself in such things to one's total ability, one makes their spirit temporary and alienates the ideals they wish to strive for by assuming the power does not already exist within themself, an opportunity.
(*)By 'spirit temporary', I mean, socialism describes a perfect ideal in which there is no conflict, so where does one fit in this conception, if one has committed themselves to the conflict? How does one even envision that future? It is a notion that I think acts in many ways in philosophy, in the tension between anarchism and republic, criticism and idealism, and 'becoming' and 'being'. The danger in that, by describing a 'disease' of the present it becomes 'infectious'. Or by accepting 'the goodness of now', we lose sight of 'full health'.