Recently I have read this and that about so called "object oriented ontology", mostly Graham Harman. Now I'm dealing with Ian Bogost, "What it's like to be a thing".
One of their line of argument looks like they try to decenter subjectivity. Not only humans, not only animals or living things should be possible bearers of subjectivity, but all "things" too. In that line of argumentation, a thing can very well be a thing for a thing.
But isn't that argument (or how I understand it) build upon a misconception of subjectivity? Or doesn't it at least change the notion of subjectivity in a way making it nearly unrecognizable? Today (cf. eliminative materialism) some are not even so sure anymore if subjectivity makes any sense at all, so it might well be justified to throw it away. But this too seems not to be the way of object oriented philosophy. Harmans fourfold still seems to have a "subjective" pole (sensuality).
Beside the noticeable fact so many of the "things" or "units" Bogost is mentioning in his many listings are man made stuff (correlationist police is watching), I do not understand how a thing can be a "thing" for a thing. My question is not emphasizing the "be", but the thing. Isn't that a concept? Or even a mere word in a language? And can stones have concepts and language?
Can a thing be exactly a "thing" for a thing?