Indeed, the thinking activity of a reflective person presupposes such a 'reflective person'. What I observe is that there are certain attributes or characteristics in words, words like 'think', 'articulate', 'summarize', 'deduce' are mainly applied to human-beings. If 'think'(subjectively) is privileged to human beings, then 'thinking' along will prove the existence of someone, if not 'I'. If these words are not only applicable to human, that some animals also possess such capabilities, there is also one distinction of human beings from animals, that is the power of subjective initiation and the 'awareness of such initiation'(self-consciousness). When someone uttered 'I', he is already using both of the attributes, that it is impossible for us not to think but simultaneously initiatively utter 'I', hence it is sufficient as proof of the existence of 'I', and thus 'think' is surplus or as a further elaboration for 'I'.
It seems to me that both 'there is thinking activity, therefore someone'(if thinking is privileged to human beings, and uttering such sentence is a think activity) or 'I, I am'(with the recognition, self-awareness of 'I' and such recognition entails thinking activity in the broadest sense) are both sufficient to prove existence of at least something, and the latter is sufficient to prove the existence of 'I'.
Is it valid?
Thank you for those who reply.
Maybe let me condense my query a bit. It is that 'I think, therefore I am' seems a bit tautological, that when he says 'I', it is simultaneously implied the cognitive activity of thinking which is necessary for I to recognize myself and to utter 'I'. Also, surely, both 'I' is identical and we are ascribing different activities or states which has the same subject 'I' relied on, and this sounds a bit tautological to me.
So when I read the critic by Bertrand Russell, I promptly agree. 'If the cogito does not presuppose a substantial self, what then is the epistemic basis for injecting the “I” into the “I think”? Some critics have complained that, in referring to the “I”, Descartes begs the question by presupposing what he means to establish in the “I exist.” Among the critics, Bertrand Russell objects that “the word ‘I’ is really illegitimate.” Echoing the 18th century thinker, Georg Lichtenberg, Russell writes that Descartes should have, instead, stated “his ultimate premiss in the form ‘there are thoughts’.” Russell adds that “the word ‘I’ is grammatically convenient, but does not describe a datum.” (1945, 567) Accordingly, “there is pain” and “I am in pain” have different contents, and Descartes is entitled only to the former'