The short answer is "because we said so," and the long answer is an interesting journey into ontology and epistemology with a slight jaunt into Quantum Mechanics just for "fun."
I am going to focus on one of your wordings, and use it to pry apart the question you are looking to ask:
... it always occupies the same position or place?
This is a phrase written in the English language, so much be interpreted according to the rules of language. To make an argument saying "it always occupies the same position or place," requires us to have some interpretation of what "occupies" means. This definition is going to require a quick cursory overview of ontology vs epistemology.
Ontology is the study of what things "are." Phrases like "this knife is sharp" show up in ontology, where "sharp" is a true trait of the knife. Epistemology is a study of how things "behave." Epistemology would change that phrase to "this knife behaves sharply," where "sharply" describes how the knife will behave.
When we get into talking about things like particles in space, we are almost always coming from an epistemological perspective. We don't actually know anything about the object. However, we do find that objects like it behave "predictably," and those predictions can be made based on points in space. A more technically correct wording for the original wording would be "it always behaves as though it occupies the same position or place." The argument for that particular phrasing can easily be founded in statistics and is the basis of modern western science.
However, in the case of some small objects where we've done many many studies on them (like electrons), it starts to get a bit pedantic to continuously talk about "behavior this" and "behavior that." After we can declare a 99.999999999% certainty that an electron behaves as though it occupies a the same position or place, it gets really tiring. At some point we make an axiomatic and unprovable claim that its epistemological behavior is its ontological essence. When we do so, we get away from ugly phrases like "we are 99.999999% certain that an electron occupies the same position or place" and get to shortcut it to the simpler "an electron occupies the same position or place." As stated in this paragraph, this change in wording has no logical argument beyond "we find the convenience of pretending the statement is ontological outweighs the risks from any inaccuracies in such a pretense."
So, to sum up the argument so far, the phrasing "it always occupies the same position or place" is a slightly inaccurate phrasing, but it's often close enough because we come across no particular reason to believe it is wrong.
This process has burned us before, so the counterargument against making such a statement is simply "we have counterexamples that prove such arguments can be false."
Take our lovely electron. We're going to put it in a section of doped silicon known as a diode. Diodes are really neat: you can mathematically show that any electron trying to approach the junction in the middle of the diode can never possibly cross it, because the greater the voltage (pushing the electron harder) the greater the force required to push the electron across teh gap. You can then go into experimentation mode, and prove that you are hopelessly wrong. Somewhere between 3 and 100V the diode suddenly lets electrons jump the gap in a way you mathematically proved was impossible (the actual voltage it occurs at is a feature of the geometry, and we actually use tuned "avalance breakdown" voltages in modern limiter circuits). Somehow, our diode did the impossible.
What we find is something known as "quantum tunneling." As the voltage across the diode piled up, the gap between the two sides got harder to cross, but it also got narrower. Eventually we find that an electron approaching this impossible to traverse barrier simply ceases to exist on one side of the barrier and starts to exist on the other side. This is terribly unintuitive, but experimental evidence has shown that the actually happens in real life in very predictable ways. In diodes, this is very evident because that first electron to skip over the gap begins neutralizing the forces within the gap, making it easier for the next electron to jump, causing something called "avalanche breakdown."
Do people wish this wasn't the case. Yes. But this is the physics we get. If the experiment says the world is round, it really doesn't matter how badly we wish the world was flat.
Quantum mechanics provides an explanation for this. It models the electron not as a point-mass with a position, but as a wave packet centered on that position in space. QM makes the claim that you can't talk about the "position of an electron," but rather you must talk about "the expectation of the position of an electron." You can run the QM numbers to show that each time this wave packet gets near the thin-but-steep barrier, part of the wave packet extends across the gap, indicating that the electron "might actually be on the other side." The math works. It describes the behaviors we see in diodes and other circuits perfectly.
So QM's argument would be that no particle has a position, just an expectation of its probabilistic distribution of positions. It would argue you cannot make an argument like "it always occupies the same position or place" because QM actually argues that it doesn't.
And so we come full circle. QM does such a good job of describing the behaviors we see, that we start getting lazy and talking in ontological terms. I see talk phrase like "the quantum numbers of this electron are (1, -1, 1, +1)," which is an ontological phrase. Even in this answer I probably made a mistake of using such wording regarding QM, and I'm actively writing an answer to raise awareness of what happens when people do it!
This has shown up in quantum gravity. It turns out that the QM models don't play well with the models that come from relativity. Both of them were actually epistemological models based on empirical evidence which have seen such good track records that people now talk about them using ontological phrasings. However, they are decidedly inconsistent when it comes to modeling gravity. The real physicists exploring this problem recognize that, ontologically, neither relativity nor QM is actually the "true" nature of a particle. They understand that both are epistemological models of behaviors, and we're going to collect new data to improve both models. However, the rest of us laypeople often forget this key detail, and start trying to phrase things like "QM must be wrong because it doesn't work with relativity." The better phrasing would be "The behaviors predicted by QM and relativity are not consistent with each other, so we should collect more data to try to understand how the real world differs from each model."