If one does not obsess over what constitutes the transition from one internal state to another, but only states that such transitions are what matters, then you are free to say the state is physiological or is a transition between ideas.
In fact, one can establish the course of such a transition at arbitrarily many different levels of abstraction, with a broad variety of framings. Is it when an electro-chemical system alters in a predictable way? Is it when an emotion has an effect? Is it when a logical accounting is made? Is it when the mind observes a change in its beliefs or ideas? How can you separate these? More importantly, why would you bother?
All of these things happen at once, and all of them are necessary aspects of any transition from one state of mind to another. Some such transitions may seem more physiological, or more emotional, or more logical, or more determinative of belief, but, from a broad enough perspective, all of them are involved all the time.
This continuum of abstractions describe exactly the same fact, and so all of these descriptions are equally real. We cannot decide the biological process of the brain is real and belief as a component of mental action is not, because they are just different ways of describing the same thing.
The mind-body problem is then just a matter of poor semantics: We have too many names for the same thing and so assume that they must differ.