In a lecture on philosophy of science I recently listened to, it was stated that Quine was the one who decisively refuted the logical positivist program. I've also read that Quine and Popper were significant challengers, but that it was Kuhn who effectively ended the logical positivist movement.
It seems to me that before any of those challengers, Gödel's incompleteness theorem would have dealt a major blow to logical positivism. If theories based on logic are inevitably incomplete or inconsistent, wouldn't it follow that stronger theories based on logic in conjunction with empirical evidence are inevitably incomplete or inconsistent as well?
On the other hand Gödel himself was a member of the Vienna Circle, and was surely sympathetic to the logical positivist's views. They couldn't have just ignored him.
- Is it fair to say that Gödel's result seriously challenges the logical positivist program?
- How did the logical positivists respond to Gödel's incompleteness theorem?