Perhaps what you're looking for is the distinction between a contingent and a necessary truth. In order to distinguish between the two, it is best to think in terms of "possible worlds" (conceiving of some world or reality where things could be different than they are in our world, usually as a result of altering the laws of nature or the chain of historical events).
Contingent truth: a proposition that is possible, rather than necessary. A proposition that is possible is neither necessarily true (a proposition that is true in all possible worlds) nor necessarily false (a proposition that is not true in any possible worlds). If there is a proposition that is true in our world, yet one can conceive of a possible world where that proposition would be false, then it is a contingent truth. For example, the proposition "If I throw this baseball, then it will fall to the ground" is contingently true because of the presence of gravity. One can easily conceive of a world where gravity does not exist (i.e. that world's laws of nature differ from our laws of nature) and therefore the proposition would not be true in that world. This is the idea behind the modal operator for possibility - a proposition preceded by such a modal operator is true if it holds true in at least one possible world. It would seem that your three propositions are contingent truths, and therefore by definition not tautologies.
Necessary truth: A proposition that is true in all possible worlds, meaning it is impossible to conceive of a possible world where the proposition is not true. For example, the proposition "P v ~P" (It is always the case that either P or ~P) is a necessary truth. It is [widely believed to be] impossible to conceive of a possible world, regardless of the nature of that possible world, where "P v ~P" does not hold. These types of truths essentially will always hold true even if humans didn't exist. (I've been told before that mathematical and logical truths are not identical, but putting that aside for a moment, think about 2 + 2 = 4. Even if there were no objects to count or humans to compute basic arithmetic, 2 + 2 will never equal another number - keep in mind this is not meant to bring into discussion the nature of perception and reality.) This is true of all theorems of logic. In propositional logic, a theorem is a proposition, or conclusion, that does not rest on any previous assumptions - it's inherently true.
Great question and props for noticing that there is something fundamentally different between the two types of propositions you quoted in you question.