Not meaning anything against you (Cain), here, but I think the example in your question gets mileage out of a fudge.
If we assume that killing an animal and eating its meat is not morally wrong, then the whole scenario is devoid of moral content.
If, conversely, we assume that killing an animal and eating its meat is morally wrong — perhaps the same in kind but not in degree, as doing this to another person (human being) — then… I venture that it is fairly obvious what one would think of someone pulling a chunk of human thigh meat out of the freezer and eating it (the question of whether or not the person in question suffered being important but tangental).
My own view — informed by my world view and sub-beliefs — is that eating (animal) meat is not how it would be in an ideal world, but is okay in this particular world as it is. Of course, I would think it terrible if the pertinent animals were subject to needless suffering (and, rightly or wrongly, I would be more concerned about a cow than about a fly).
Thinking of the question of whether or not eating meat is morally wrong… although philosophers seek to argue through to positions that their opponents must accept (and this is a worthy pursuit), it is nonetheless obviously true that … not only one’s starting position, but also how one builds on it, is very much a function of one’s world view.
As for your original question…
We need here to draw a distinction between the natural and immediate consequences of an action, and consequences that might arise in some particular situation. The former is the content of the moral principle in question. To kill someone is morally wrong precisely because they end up dead; this is definitive of the concept of killing someone.
Beyond that, there is the interesting field of ethical dilemmas (which I take to include situations of that sort that are hardly any sort of dilemma).
Borrowing the extreme example of User6726… turning on a light is not morally wrong, but it is theoretically possible that a situation obtain in which doing that would result in a death (and the tangental questions around the contingency that the subject does or does not know this).
In the case of this extreme example, it is quite obvious that, if indeed one did know that flicking the light switch would result in a death, it would be definitely morally wrong to do so. Again, this is an extreme example of ethical dilemma; in such cases, there are no implications for the moral value of turning on a light.
That suggests a discussion about consequentialism. This is a difficulty for consequentialism (which, I think I can safely say, defines moral wrong as pertaining to situations, rather than to universal principles); if we do not believe beforehand that killing people is wrong (or that doing to people things that they strongly dislike is wrong)… it is difficult to argue that a particular act in a particular situation is wrong on the grounds that it involves killing someone. (Alternatively, we simply have a moral principle that hurting people is morally wrong, and the rest is situational detail.) [I could possibly have quoted a source for this line of argument in the past. It is a basic, early objection against consequentialism.]
Having said all that… it seems that your question is (perhaps) really about whether someone who is involved in, but more distant from, an evil act is less guilty. To think about this, we need an example in which someone does something that is immediately wrong, and presumably benefits from this, and someone else also benefits from it through endorsing it.
If we assume that the second someone benefits just as much as the original evil-doer, then an example might be that there are two people who stand to gain a lot of money by killing someone; one does the killing and both benefit. My intuition, in this case, is that both are guilty of the killing, but that we tend to assume that the one who was not directly involved did not quite have the stomach for it and is slightly less morally depraved (but we do not actually know whether they are or not).
Thinking of an example in which someone is more distant from an evil act, but still involved, is not so easy. (Also, I am not very good at thinking of examples.) A group of people physically attacking someone does not work, because each one participates directly, to a lesser or greater degree.
I am thinking that it is actually not logical to have someone somehow distant from an evil act, but still personally responsible for the act being done. It is possible to be in a position to benefit from an evil deed that is simply a past event into which one has no input, but that is a distinct question.
The example of the feudal Lord is interesting, but I think is obscured behind the fact that the Lord is ostensibly executing justice as a qualified political persona.
I am inclined to think that there is indeed no type of case in which one is responsible for an evil act, but distant from it in some way that retains the moral responsibility but somehow decreases it according to the postulated “distance” (and that it is not merely that I can not think of an example).