This question broadly regards the Denettian "intentional stance" to agency, which says that on the most fundamental level there are only physical things in the world, but nevertheless for certain complex physical entities (and people in particular) it is often pragmatically useful to treat them as if they were agents acting according to beliefs, goals, etc., rather than try to understand them fully on the physical level.
In order to do this, we have to decide which parts of the physical world constitute the agent and which its environment. In some cases there may be more than one useful place in which this boundary can be drawn - Clark and Chalmers give the example of a person called Otto who has to write everything in a notebook due to a memory disorder, and they argue that the notebook can reasonably be seen as part of Otto as an agent.
With that background in place, my question is as follows: is there a name for the "cut" that we must make in order to apply the intentional stance, between something we wish to treat as agent and its environment?
There are two other "cuts" that seem related, but not the same. The first is the "Cartesian cut" between the world of the physical and the world of the mental. This cut is different because it is a cut between two parts of the physical world - one that is to be considered an agent, and one that consists of everything else.
The other related cut is the "Heisenberg cut" in quantum mechanics, between the system we wish to measure (to be treated using quantum theory) and the apparatus we use to measure it (to be treated classically). This cut shares the property that we have some flexibility in where we draw it, but it deals with a different domain of enquiry.