Modal fallacy deals with modal logic, a 20th century construct, as user @Virmaior comments in his comment to the question Who Invented the Modal Fallacy?. However, in discussing the sea battle argument for logical fatalism in his De_Interpretatione and his refutation, Aristotle writes (I quote from this internet translation of De_Interpretatione that I found on the internet, happens to be the same as the one used by wikipedia, which cites a broken link):
Let me illustrate. A sea-fight must either take place to-morrow or not, but it is not necessary that it should take place to-morrow, neither is it necessary that it should not take place, yet it is necessary that it either should or should not take place to-morrow. Since propositions correspond with facts, it is evident that when in future events there is a real alternative, and a potentiality in contrary directions, the corresponding affirmation and denial have the same character.
This is the case with regard to that which is not always existent or not always nonexistent. One of the two propositions in such instances must be true and the other false, but we cannot say determinately that this or that is false, but must leave the alternative undecided. One may indeed be more likely to be true than the other, but it cannot be either actually true or actually false. It is therefore plain that it is not necessary that of an affirmation and a denial one should be true and the other false. For in the case of that which exists potentially, but not actually, the rule which applies to that which exists actually does not hold good. The case is rather as we have indicated.
In other words, the only thing that is necessary is the dichotomy (there are only two possible outcomes); neither of the two outcomes are necessary. Therefore, Aristotle essentially states that it is wrong to deduce from "this outcome occurred" that "this outcome necessarily occurs". This is the logical error by which Aristotle refutes the sea battle argument for logical necessity. Yet this is the modal scope fallacy; wikipedia states the fallacy as "a fallacy in the logic of a syllogism whereby a degree of unwarranted necessity is placed," which is the logical error that is going on. Hence, it appears as if Aristotle has recognized the Modal scope fallacy.
However, the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy's article on fatalism, which includes a discussion of Aristotle's sea battle argument and refutaton, while recognizing this view ("On one view he rejects the move from truth to necessity"), asserts that there is ambiguity and presents a second view: "On this view his solution is to deny that it is necessary that the affirmation or the negation is true or false when this relates to things that do not happen of necessity." There are two quotes I identified which support each view coming from Aristotle. The first one, the first part of the second sentence of the second paragraph in the block quote above, "One of the two propositions in such instances must be true and the other false", implies that Aristotle does not reject the law of ambivalence as is claimed by the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. However, the last part of the very next sentence (third sentence, second paragraph), "it cannot be either actually true or actually false", seems to support the second position. However, this is circumvented if "actually true" and "actually false" refer to logical as opposed to contingent truths.
Hence, though my question is whether my observation that Aristotle recognize the Modal scope fallacy in his rejection of the sea battle argument is correct, it can be narrowed down to whether the first or second view identified in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy article is correct, and more specifically whether Aristotle does recognize certain concepts of modal logic.
Citations or references to other works of Aristotle, especially in the Organon, are appreciated. According to a comment by @MoziburUllah to this question, in response to my comment which states that modal logic was formulated formally in the 20th century (affirming Virmaior's comment stated above), "Aristotles books on logic - the organon - has a good introduction to the formal consideration of modal logic ie necessity and possibility and their inter-dependence," thus fueling my speculation that Aristotle does recognize the difference between contingent and necessary truths (a view shared by wikipedia), and correctly identifies the Modal scope fallacy.