The weakest normal modal logic, named K in honor of Saul Kripke, is simply the propositional calculus augmented by □, the rule N, and the axiom K. K is weak in that it fails to determine whether a proposition can be necessary but only contingently necessary. That is, it is not a theorem of K that if □p is true then □□p is true, i.e., that necessary truths are "necessarily necessary".
So perhaps what is necessary isn't necessarily necessary.
But what about intrinsicality? If something is intrinsic, is that a fact intrinsic to what it is intrinsic to?
Lewis has in several places (1983a, 1986a, 1988) insisted that shape properties are intrinsic, but one could hold that an object's shape depends on the curvature of the space in which it is embedded, and this might not even be intrinsic to that space (Nerlich 1979)
But it is easy to imagine that shape is an intrinsic property of what has a shape. So is e.g. is it an intrinsic fact about an object that it intrinsically has its shape? And what would that mean?
I am asking because I assume that all intrinsic obligations are intrinsically rational.
Assuming that, perhaps claiming that everything intrinsically rational was intrinsically valuable, would practically make it intrinsically rational that any value is intrinsically rational.
- And would that mean all intrinsic value is self-evident?