Consider the following definition of set given by Cantor in a letter to Dedekind:
If on the other hand the totality of the elements of a multiplicity can be thought of without contradiction as 'being together', so that they can be gathered together into 'one thing' I call it a consistent multiplicity or a 'set'.
("Letter to Dedekind" (1899), in From Frege to Godel: A Source Book in Mathematical Logic, 1879-1931, edited by Jean van Heijenoort, pg 114)
If one precisely formulated this principle in the formal language of set theory and added it as a axiom (or even used as-is as a 'rule-of-thumb' of set formation) to (for) the following version of Naive Set Theory:
Extensionality: Given two sets A and B , A=B iff (x)[x 'is a member of' A iff x is a member of' B]
Comprehension: Given any predicate P(x), the set {x|P(x)} exists and (a)[a 'is a member of' {x| P(x)} iff P(a)]
Can one still derive paradoxes from this amended version of Naive Set Theory? (In using this definition as a 'rule-of-thumb' for set formation one seeks to gather together the elements of the multiplicity into 'one thing' in such manner as to avoid the apparent paradox.)