Putnam is known for changing his mind often, but he seems to hold two views of linguistic meaning and reference simultaneously, combining which seems paradoxical. One is Quine's inscrutability of reference, with a vengeance: "The referential relation is inscrutable, because it is subject to the background language and ontological commitments of the speaker... Hilary Putnam uses Quine's thesis about the inscrutability of reference to challenge the traditional Realist's view that there is a mind-independent world to which our propositional attitudes refer (e.g. when we talk about or think of something, these things exist not in our minds, but in said mind-independent world)... On Putnam's account, the idea that we refer with our sentences and statements to a mind-independent, nonlinguistic world is an illusion... He suggests, that, because the referential objects of a language are always inscrutable, the Realist's idea of a mind-independent world is ought to be a fallacy, because it presupposes distinct referential relations from language to objects in the mind-independent world".
The other is Kripke's rigid designation, for things such as water, gold, bees, etc. Here is Kripke:"*All I mean is that in any possible world where the object in question does exist, in any situation where the object would exist, we use the designator in question to designate that object. In a situation where the object does not exist, then we should say that the designator has no referent and that the object in question so designated does not exist."
Clearly, Putnam's view of linguistic reference is non-traditional since "water" can not (traditionally) designate a non-existent referent in an inscrutable illusion. Nonetheless it remains "real" enough to be counterfactually rigid, socially sharable, and even open to future discovery. On what theory does Putnam combine all of the above? Is that Kripke's position also?