Dennett, a functionalists, has an intricate theory to explain why some people believe in the existence of qualia; essentially, he argues that qualia is an illusion played on us by the brain, and he goes to great length to justify this position with neurology, psychology, etc...
In fact a lot of his 1993 book Consciousness Explained is devoted to explaining this illusion.
Has any notable dualist made a similar kind of effort to explain the fact that so many people insist that there is nothing in their mind that cannot be explained in terms of a sufficiently complex arrangement of cogwheels [*]?
Note, that I am not interested in a home-grown explanation, nor in a quote or a paragraph-long hand-waved explanation by a philosopher, since I aware of some such quotes, or can come up with all kind of explanations by myself, such as our strong dogmatic belief in objective science, conceptual limitations, perhaps Dennett is a zombie, the parable of fish swimming in water, the invisible keys on the table, etc...
I am interested in an explanation of a breadth and scope comparable to that of Dennett's, say at least a chapter worth of discussion.
Can you refer me to such an explanation or discussion of the problem?
[*] @JoWehler objected in a comment, that people do not subscribe to explaining the mind as an arrangement of cogwheels; while I do not wish to turn this into an back and forth exchange of arguments, I would like to explain my statement; a lot of people subscribe to explaining the mind as a form of computation (e.g. Dennett); but computation, as we understand it since Turing, is a mechanical process; any computation may be carried out by a Universal Turing Machine, and in turn, a Universal Turing Machine may be physically implemented as a "purely" mechanical machine, for example one made of cogwheels, and other such mechanical parts.
Therefore, people who subscribe to explaining the mind as a computation, also subscribe as a consequence to explaining the mind as a sufficiently complex arrangement of cogwheels - which brings us to another out-of-my-sleeve explanation, namely that at least some of these people don't know what they are talking about.
btw, you can compare the statement about explaining the mind by ... cogwheels, to the mill argument of Leibniz - http://home.datacomm.ch/kerguelen/monadology/printable.html#17
Also, I disagree that this is equivalent to saying that the mind can be explained in terms of neurological processes, since it is not clear what people mean by that, that statement can be stretched until it becomes vacuous; even Searle says that if we view the brain as a machine then machines can trivially have a mind; dualists do not generally disagree that qualia is a natural phenomenon generated by the brain.
Here is the quote by searle from Minds, Brains, and Science (1984, p. 35): "in one sense, of course, we are all machines. We can construe the stuff inside our heads as a meat machine. And of course, we can all think. So, in one sense of 'machine', namely that sense in which a machine is just a physical system which is capable of performing certain kinds of operations, in that sense, we are all machines, and we can think. So, trivially, there are machines that can think."