In §85 of Ideas I, Husserl classifies all mental processes into intentional and non-intentional mental processes. The class of non-intentional mental processes contains all sensuous mental processes.
Among the former [class of non-intentional mental processes] belong certain "sensuous" mental processes which are unitary with respect to their highest genus, "sensation-contents" such as color-Data, touch-Data and tone-Data, and the like, which we shall no longer confuse with appearing moments of physical things.
It is possible to distinguish the content of sensuous mental processes from sensuous mental processes. If I am interpreting Husserl correctly, then he is arguing that sensuous mental processes form a class. A defining property of this class is that every mental processes belonging to it has a sensuous content. The distinction between a sensuous mental process and the sensuous content of a sensuous mental process is then analogous to the distinction between a representation and a representing of an object.
On my reading, Husserl distinguishes a sensuous mental process from the sensuous content of a sensuous mental processes. The sensuous contents of sensuous mental processes are classified according to different sensory modalities. Another possible reading is that Husserl is identifying sensuous mental processes and the sensuous contents of sensuous mental processes. If so, then Husserl is arguing that all sensuous content is identical with a sensuous mental processes. Here, the proper analogy would be to adverbial theories of perception, in which a sensation of red is identified with a sensing redly.
The proper interpretation of this passage is important, because it immediately precedes Husserl's discussion of the hyletic moments of intentional acts. Which is the proper interpretation? Is Husserl claiming that all sensuous mental processes contain sensuous contents, or is Husserl claiming that all sensuous mental processes are sensuous contents?