General scientism seems to hold that due to the predictive powers of our scientific methods, such methods are preferred to other methods of knowledge, such as metaphysics (radical scientism claiming that metaphysics is by and large simply irrelevant to actual knowledge). The metaphysician then claims that this claim of scientism is itself not a scientific claim, but rather a metaphysical claim, and so it is self-refuting. This metaphysical nature can be seen even in the claim's most primary assumptions, including its primary assumption that a method is 'good' so as to be preferred over another thing simply because it is predictive of events (for it can and must be asked what makes the 'quality of being predictive' to be 'good').
Quine differs from many scientism proponents however in his understanding of the nature of what constitues a method as 'scientific'. My question is about the way in which Quine regards any justification of scientism as a 'scientific' claim, which would be apparently necessary in order to avoid self-refutation. In short, how does Quine respond to the metaphysician's refutation that scientism is itself not a scientific claim, but rather a metaphysical claim?