Wikipedia's "analytic and continental philosophers differ on the importance and influence of subsequent philosophers on their respective traditions... Hegel is viewed as a relatively minor figure for the work of analytic philosophers" surprised me a little. I always thought that philosophy does have the little of consensus that Friedman describes in Dynamics of Reason "although we do not (and I believe should not) achieve a stable consensus on the results of distinctively philosophical debate, we do nonetheless achieve a relatively stable consensus on what are the important contributions to the debate, and accordingly on what moves and arguments must be taken seriously".
What of the evolutionary approach and social/pragmatic turn in analytic philosophy since 1960s? Society as Geist, and social practice as the standard of truth in epistemology are parts of Marx's reading of Hegel, Hegelian roots of Peirce's pragmatism are self-acknowledged, "my philosophy resuscitates Hegel, though in a strange costume", as is Peirce's influence on the Vienna Circle and Quine.
Exhibit A is late Wittgenstein, of language games and "don't ask for meaning, ask for use", Marx could sign under that. And even the ladder from Tractatus, that can be kicked once climbed, sounds like an allusion to Phenomenology of Geist, intended to be the ladder to absolute knowledge. Exhibit B is the social turn in Western historiography of science prompted by Hessen, a Marxist historian, whose "focus on the relationship between society and science was, in its time, seen as novel and inspiring", and "became known as externalism, looking at the manner in which science and scientists are affected, and guided by, their context and the world in which they exist". I suspect that externalism in the philosophy of mind (Putnam, Chalmers) had something to do with it. Which brings me to Exhibit C, Kuhn. Scientific Revolutions were published by none other than Carnap himself, and certainly left a mark on philosophy of science. By the way, in 1930s Kuhn had a predecessor:"Bachelard’s The New Scientific Spirit (1934) revolved around a non-linear conception of scientific change. Drawing on a dynamic view of the history of science (another common point between Bachelard and Kuhn), he characterized scientific change in terms of breaks and revolutions, with new ideas ‘enveloping’ and replacing old ones".
Is Friedman too optimistic? Does Wikipedia reflect an existing sentiment? Is there an alternative reading of history on which analytic philosophy avoided Hegelian influence after all? Or is it considered minor? Perhaps, "minor figure" is the legacy of Moore and Russell defining themselves in contradistinction to absolute idealism, reinforced by Heidegger's embrace of it? (Ironically, the continental forefather Husserl had similar feelings: away from Hegel, "to things themselves")