The project of rigidly correlating consciousness with brain states has met with many refutations. But I have never heard of one that refers to one of the simplest physical facts about consciousness.
No matter how defined, we have no examples of "consciousness" that did not arise out of the generational horizon of sexual reproduction, fertilization, gestation, and birth. Moreover, the most fundamental operations of consciousness seek to return it to this cellular continuum, the only space in which it can be preserved against entropy.
Yet in attempting a material monism or what is called a "physicalist" modeling of consciousness and brain states, the "model" is invariably isolated or "lifted out" of this physical continuum. This itself smacks of the very Cartesian dualism the physical models wish to avoid.
Shouldn't any definition of "consciousness" entail the necessity of its own reproduction and cellular preservation? In failing to do so, are "brain state" theories actually dualist? Is this inseparability from a cellular continuum, in itself, a defensible argument against mind-brain reductions?
(And, if I may add, is there some clearer way in the mind-body literature to sort out what I'm trying to ask? I am always scandalized by the absence of the sexual continuum in philosophy, but never sure how to insert it into arguments, hence the "feminism" tag.)