Induction here is considered in light of the modern view, which is the practice of inferring from particulars to generals. Hume believes that such inference is very problematic since it holds two things not necessarily related (in the sense that such a regularity shall not always occur) to be related. In such an analysis of induction there seems to be presupposed a certain inference of a different kind. For example, take the regularity of 'event B' following upon 'event A'. It seems that we must question the relationship we have to the events themselves, for it seems that our experience of 'event A' and our experience itself must be causally related. This is said because Hume's criticism of induction is apparently that we can think about and conceive of the events in question independent of each other, and so we needn't think that the two are necessarily related; but the same cannot be said of our experience and that which is experienced (the events themselves). This is because if try to think or conceive of such an event independent of our experience, such is an impossibility (in that we only conceive of such an event through the experience of it). We would be left with the ludicrous position of conceiving of that which we have yet to conceive of. Furthermore, if we try to conceive of our experience independent of that which is experienced, such also results in self-contradiction, since we know of our experience only in the experience of that which is experienced. So it seems that the presupposition of induction of any kind, at least according to the widely accepted Humean analysis of it, is that we can conceive of such events and terms in simpler or distinct ways. But oddly enough, this very point seems to indicate that we are in fact causally related to the world, through our experience of it.
Now more could be said of Hume's analysis, such as the non sequitur that Hume seems to get away with in believing that simply because we can conceive of two things independent from the other, it follows that the regularity in question is not explained in the context existent by some contingently necessary relation between the two things in question. So it seems that Hume's analysis is altogether merely descriptive rather than explanatory. But this is beside the point. The question to be answered is regarding whether or not the typical connotation of 'induction' that the modern world is accustomed to really does presuppose more necessary inferences into its terms, and if this indicates causality itself, at least between our experience and the events experienced.