This is in a way a followup to the question on Wittgenstein's standard metre of Paris, which is part of his discussion on names in language.
In philosophical investigations §55, Wittgenstein says:
[A] man is surely what corresponds to his name. But he is destructible, and his name does not lose its meaning when its bearer is destroyed. -- A paradigm that is used in conjunction with a name in a language-game -- that would be an example of something which corresponds to a name and without which it would have no meaning.
Then he goes on to discuss the word "red" and its correspondence to the red color, and in §57 he says:
For what if you cannot remember the colour any more? -- If we forget which colour this is the name of, the name loses its meaning for us; that is, we’re no longer able to play a particular language-game with it. And then the situation is comparable to that in which we’ve lost a paradigm which was an instrument of our language.
First, I suppose the second quote expresses Witggenstein's opinion, rather than his imaginary interlocutor; is that correct?
Second, suppose a person becomes blind, and after a while does not remember how red looks like - we can imagine two cases, the one which Wittgenstein often goes back to is that if one can only appeal to memory, then what is the criteria of correctness? - that is, what criteria can a blind man have for the memory of red? or, alternatively we can suppose that because of some neurological damage he can bring to mind no color whatsoever. nevertheless, when such a person says to a shopkeeper, "please give me five red apples", is he being meaningless?
Can you explain?
EDIT - I see questions about Wittgenstein are not very popular; which justifies a recommendation: go read the Philosophical Investigations!
That said, here is a continuation of the original question; in §293 Wittgenstein describes the famous beetle in a box:
everyone tells me that he knows what pain is only from his own case! — Suppose that everyone had a box with something in it which we call a “beetle”. No one can ever look into anyone else’s box, and everyone says he knows what a beetle is only by looking at his beetle. — Here it would be quite possible for everyone to have something different in his box. One might even imagine such a thing constantly changing. — But what if these people’s word “beetle” had a use nonetheless? — If so, it would not be as the name of a thing. The thing in the box doesn’t belong to the language-game at all; not even as a Something: for the box might even be empty.
It seems to be in conflict with §57 which I quoted above, does it not?
EDIT 2 - Following a discussion with @Johannes it occurred to me that maybe the answer to my question is that I have originally read Wittgenstein's remark too broadly — that when he writes "If we forget which colour this is the name of, the name loses its meaning for us; that is, we’re no longer able to play a particular language-game with it.", he means that it loses some of its meaning, not all of it — it does not become meaningless — we can no longer play a particular game with it, but there are other games that we can continue to play.