BUT IS THERE A CONTRADICTION ?
Nelson Pike has a formal argument to reconcile the existence of an omnipotent, omniscient, and omnibenevolent (perfectly good) God with the existence of evil in the form of suffering :
(a) An ommipotent, omniscient, and perfectly good being
would create the best of all possible worlds;
(b) It is logically possible - or, at least, it cannot be
shown to be logically impossible - that the best of all possible worlds might contain instances of suffering;
(c) If it is logically possible that the best of all possible
worlds might contain instances of suffering, these instances
of suffering would be logically necessary components of the
best of all possible worlds;
(d) Thus, if it is possible that instances of suffering are
necessary components of the best of all possible worlds, then there might be a morally sufficient reason for an omnipotent
and omniscient being to permit instances of suffering.
The morally sufficient reason does not entail any lack of knowledge or power.
(Nelson Pike, 'Hume on Evil', The Philosophical Review, LXXII, 15-16 (reprinted
in Nelson Pike, ed. God and Evil, Englewood Cliffs, 1974. Quotation taken from Eduardo O. C. Chaves, 'Logical and Semantical Aspects of the Problem of Evil', Crítica: Revista Hispanoamericana de Filosofía, Vol. 10, No. 29 (Aug., 1978), 15-15.)
Pike refers to 'suffering', you talk of 'evil'. The logic of his argument is unaffected if you substitute 'evil' for 'suffering'.
GOD, EVIL AND THE LOGICALLY POSSIBLE
There is an inclination to say : but it must be possible for an omnipotent, omniscient, and omnibenevolent (perfectly good) God to create a world - the best possible - which is without suffering or evil. But God can only do what it is logically possible to do; God's omnipotence does not exceed the logically possible. To defeat Pike's argument you would need to conceive in full specificity a logically possible world, X, that was both the best possible and exempt from suffering or evil. I do not see how we can know an apriori or in any other way that it must be logically possible for God to create world X.
Only if we can know this does your paradox or contradiction arise. Or to put the point another way : you can conceive, I don't doubt, of a world, Y, that is exempt from suffering or evil, but unless you can conceive of all logically possible worlds how would you know that that world Y in its totality is the best that is logically possible ?
No religious motivation informs this answer.