In ordinary language we use properties, like blue, smooth, triangular, electrically charged, and so on, and it is the starting point to the problem of universals that we believe that the particular things we describe with these adjectives possess the corresponding properties objectively.
Now realism of universals tries to explain the fact that different particulars can share the same properties with certain mind-independent entities, namely universals, like blueness, smoothness, triangularity, electrical charge.
But it seems extremely implausible to believe that for every property there is a such corresponding universal. A Ming vase worth a million dollars is objectively "Ming" and probably objectively expensive, too. Or phrased differently, the properties "Ming" and "expensive" aren't just inventions in our minds, but they really objectively apply to to the vase. So does the vase instantiate "Ming-ness" and expensiveness?
If it doesn't, realists must admit that we get away in these cases without resorting universals. But then why do we need them in other cases? If there is no explanation, this sems like a reductio ad absurdum of realism. How is this argument countered by realists?