As I continue my deep read of Kant's first critique, I'm struck by the fact that both space and time are a priori concepts, known to us prior to any experience, CPR(A) Transcendental Aesthetic, S.7 p.39-40. But so too are the 12 categories in his framework. To be pure concepts, he tells us, they must also be a priori. CPR(A), Transcendental Logic, S.10, p.78-79.
What is the operative relationship among Kant's a priori elements?
A skeptic may ask whether is matters. But it matters in my analysis because I am trying to understand whether the nature of the 12 categories are essentially equivalent to space and time, or somehow derived from them.
In his first critique, space and time are "two totally distinct kinds of concepts" and specificially describes them as "forms of sensibility", whereas, in the same paragraph the categories themselves are "concepts of the understanding" CPR(A) S.13, p.85-86. This takes me down the path of separateness. And yet, as a priori concepts, there is a sameness that to me makes them function in a similar way, generalized abstractions with which we can categorize and frame our knowledge.
What guidance is available on this?