Philosophers sometimes liken conscious experience to an unexpected shadow of cognition, or to the steam coming out of a steam engine — an inert epiphenomena. A lot of ink has been spilled about that.

Has anyone pursued the reverse? that, the sum of what we can describe by language or model as mechanism from the nature of our mind, is just a shadow of the mind — that the immaterial nature of conscious-experience which dualists insist on, is another aspect of, or a glimpse into the nature of the mind that reaches beyond these shadows.

Think of it in analogy to the shadows on the wall of plato's cave, with the shadows being what we can capture of the nature of our mind, in mechanism (rather than being the shadows of the reality outside our mind, or the shadows of a platonic realm of abstract ideas — the table-ness as an essence of all tables).

It could be a form of monism (but not idealism, or physicalism), but the literature on this is immense and I am seeking for references to possible discussions in this direction.

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    How is the position you're describing different from either Plato or Berkeley? – Alexander S King Dec 16 '15 at 7:46
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    I am not talking of a realm of abstract concepts, where the perfect table, or the perfect circle await us. As for Berkeley, I don't know, but I am not bent in particular on idealism — I'm not saying that everything is a mind or ideas in a mind, but that mechanism can only describe an aspect of the mind. – nir Dec 16 '15 at 8:24

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