I've always assumed Hegel had one dialectical definition of thought relative to life, one for life relative to matter, and some other definition for matter.
But strangely, I can't find anything with the 3 bolded words while searching by plain text in Phänomenologie des Geistes.
I consider Hegel beyond a genius, so I can't conceive his neglect of precise definitions of material, living and thinking beings.
add relative to Joseph Weissman "too broad" hold post : let me just be precise. Consider a pebble (material being), a swallow (living being), and "2+2=4" (an idea). You have a strong feeling that these beings are not of the same kind, doesn't belong to same being category. You can also feel that each of these categories or kind of beings have a strong internal identity, you feel you could strongly define what is relatively to each other, the identity o a material, living and idea being (I can do it in one sentence).
So : how Hegel do that ? (in one paragraph).
Answers already given by Hegel's gnostics below explains that this question make no sense because the Hegel's way of thinking is soooo faaaar above the "immediacy" that encrap this kind of question i.e. that I am a moron to ask such question.
Ok ok I'm a moron but who can the most can the least : from the Hegel's "absolute" so superior way of thinking, please derive the difference that everybody can see between a pebble, a swallow and 2+2=4. In one paragraph.
Or just say Hegel's philosophy is unable to do it.