Abbreviate Definition to D, Intension to IN and Extension to EN (eg IND = Intensional Definition).
I desire to, but I am unsure whether I should, abridge my long quote; feel free to emend my post.
Source: A Concise Introduction to Logic (12 Ed, 2014) by Patrick J. Hurley
[p 92:] The previous section of this chapter explored the cognitive meaning of language in general. The cognitive meaning of terms comprises two kinds: intensional and extensional. The intensional meaning, or intension, consists of the qualities or attributes that the term connotes, and the extensional meaning, or extension, consists of the members of the class that the term denotes. For example, the intensional meaning of the term “cat” consists of the attributes of being furry, of having four legs, of moving in a certain way, of emitting certain sounds, and so on, while the extensional meaning consists of cats themselves—all the cats in the universe. The term connotes the attributes and denotes the cats.
[p 106:] Although it is conceivable that extensional definitions could also serve as techniques for theoretical and persuasive definitions (though this would be highly unusual),
extensional definitions by themselves cannot properly serve as precising definitions for the following reason.
The function of a precising definition is to clarify a vague word, and vagueness is a problem affecting intensional meaning. Because the intension is imprecise, the extension is indefinite. To attempt to render the intension precise by exactly specifying the extension (as with an extensional definition) would be tantamount to
having extension determine intension—which cannot be done.
The principle that intension determines extension, whereas the converse is not true, underlies the fact that
all extensional definitions suffer serious deficiencies.
For example, in the case of the demonstrative definition of the word “chair,” if all the chairs pointed to are made of wood, observers might get the idea that “chair” means “wood” instead of something to sit on. Similarly, they might get the idea that “Washington Monument” means “tall” or “pointed” or any of a number of other things. From the definition of “actress,” readers or listeners might think that “actress” means “woman”— which would include countless individuals who have nothing to do with the stage or screen. From the definition of “tree” they might get the idea that “tree” means “firmly planted in the ground,” which would also include the pilings of a building. And they
[p 107:] might think that “cetacean” means “aquatic animal,” which includes salmon, tuna, squid, manatees, and so on. In other words, it makes no difference how many individuals or subclasses are named in an extensional definition, there is no assurance that listeners or readers will get the intensional meaning. Extensions can suggest intensions, but they cannot determine them.
I do not understand the grey above, but do understand all else.
[4.] Why can only IND determine END? Eg: an IND for a cat may not resolve unclear and vague cases; eg, some strange felid hybrid may match all your attributes, but may still not be a cat.
[5.] Why cannot
END determine IND? 3 implies that only
END suffer serious deficiencies, but to me, END appears equally effective as IND? For example, detailed information (eg: physical evidence, pictures, videos) of 95% of all cats may inform more about cats than any IND.