Husserl is perhaps the last truly classical figure in epistemology, he still believed in objective content of knowledge, the same for "angels and centaurs" as for humans, and the possibility of "apodictic certainty" at the end of eidetic and phenomenological investigations. He believed that by suspending ("bracketing out") stereotypes and presuppositions, and resolving into a state of "pure consciousness" we can reach the "things themselves", as they primordially reveal themselves to us. And that this revelation is the ultimate grounding of all knowledge. But yes, much of his optimistic maximalism does not appear feasible in the age of cynicism, doubt and suspicion.
In explaining how we should move "to things themselves" Husserl presents our mental faculties differently prom Kant, his transcendental idealist predecessor, with his unreachable things in themselves, productive imagination, and synthetic a priori. In particular, Husserl points out that our perception is not purely sensual but covers a spectrum, with sensuality being only an impoverished abstraction towards one of its ends. Abstracting towards the other end we discover "ideation", ideal perception, direct grasping of eidoses ("essenses") as they present themselves "in" sensual particulars, this is eidetic reduction. In this view of essences as "sekundär realisiert" beside the material objects one can discern a refined version of Aristotelian realism about universals (although Husserl was a transcendental idealist), enriched by detailed phenomenological analysis of perception and intuition. Eidetic reduction is the first step towards "primordial" knowledge.
The second step involves another movement away from the "natural" attitude, along what Husserl calls noema/noesis pole, roughly from content/representation to comprehension. In this second, phenomenological, reduction to pure consciousness the subject/object divide is supposedly dissolved, and apodictic certainty of things as they reveal themselves is supposedly attained. It is important that unlike "rational intuition" of Descartes and Leibniz Husserl's "eidetic intuition" (ideal perception) does not give us some backdoor access to the ultimate nature of things. Instead it strives to exploit more fully the non-mystical frontdoor access to phenomena that we all are familiar with. Phenomenological investigation aims at elucidating received (empirical) knowledge through revealing its intrinsic eidetic and intentional structures, i.e. its meaning.
As for detachment, Husserl was a great believer in our ability to abstract from psychological habits and stereotypes, the entire first volume of Logical Investigations is dedicated to the critique of "psychologism", the supposed dependence of logical on empirical. Husserl's favorite argument against psychologism is its metabasis fallacy, "a faulty though obvious shifting of problems. This shifting occurs between the psychological explanation of knowledge according to the methodical standards of natural sciences on the one hand and analyzing knowledge phenomena in terms of their intrinsic eidetic structures on the other hand". In other words, while pre-existing morality, emotions, beliefs, etc., have psychological effect on the process of deliberation, according to Husserl they are simply irrelevant to "intrinsic eidetic structures" of knowledge. And phenomenology is a system of intellectual ("logical" in the old sense of the word) techniques to purge knowledge of this psychologistic baggage.
A nice review of epistemological issues in Husserl's phenomenology is Rinofner-Kreidl's Phenomenologist's Reply (to Quine) in Husserl and the Sciences edited by Feist.
