A lot of debate in the "omnipotent being" or "omnipotent, omniscient, omnipresent, omnibenevolent, etc." being debate revolves around the definition of the terms. I consider the "strong form" of omnipotence to involve the ability of an omnipotent being to do both logically possible and logically impossible things.
My Question Is:
Can you split up the analysis of strong omnipotence into parts of "able to do all logically possible things", and "able to do all logically impossible things", and analyze these two categories separately?
Some Example Cases To Consider
If God Can Do Anything, is He Unknowable?
The leading answer to "Is the definition of God consistent?", for example, claims a strong form of omnipotence, that God can truly do anything, but then goes on to claim that as a result, God is unknowable.
I agree that the part of God which is able to do illogical things would be unknowable, but can't we separate our analysis of that part (suspend judgment, if you will) and still gain knowledge about God in the areas where he does interact with the universe and/or us on a logically consistent basis?
Is Plantinga's Free Will Defense Limited to "Weak Omnipotence"?
Coming from the other direction, Plantinga's Free Will defense assumes a logically consistent definition of the omni-being, including what I term "weak omnipotence", which is limited to the ability to do anything which is logically possible.
By the same token could you argue that this defense would apply to the subset of an omnipotent being which entails "all logical power that exists", without having to address any superset of additional powers? Or would that defense be limited only to omnipotent beings who are defined as 100% confined to the logical realm?