1) The first incompleteness theorem of Gödel:
Any effectively generated theory capable of expressing elementary arithmetic cannot be both consistent and complete.
In particular, for any consistent, effectively generated formal theory that proves certain basic arithmetic truths, there is an arithmetical statement that is true, but not provable in the theory.
This theorem restricts the scope of provability, in short: Not all theorems of the theory are provable within the theory.
2) The second incompleteness theorem of Gödel:
For any formal effectively generated theory T including basic arithmetical truths and also certain truths about formal provability, if T includes a statement of its own consistency then T is inconsistent.
In short: This theorem hinders a theory to prove its own consistency.
Both theorems are statements from the field of mathematical logic. Both have been proved and both do not refer to the physical world. They show that Hilbert’s program of formalization cannot be kept up.
3) Kant’s antinomies refer to the boundaries of our rational argumentation and experience. Kant argues in Critic of Pure Reason that statements about all embracing concepts like the world create antinomies. These concepts are only applicable within the domain of experience, which is the domain of the physical world.
Was Kant anticipating Gödel's incompleteness with his antinomies?
Both, Kant and Gödel prove the impossibility of certain rational approaches.
That’s what both have in common.
But both refer to different fields: Mathematical logic (Gödel), epistemology (Kant).
I also have never heard that the idea has ever been discussed in Kant’s time, that an axiomatized system may have principal boundaries of its scope. On the opposite, Euclid’s concept of axiomatization was held by all as the paradigm of scientific reliability.
Hence my answer to the question of the post is „No“.