If all that exists is mind, then Nature is an emanation of mind, and its apparent order is the order of our minds. All useful forms of idealism assume our internal intuition is at base fully in tune with the nature of the physical world, or the physical world could not exist. From that point of view, of course mental models of Nature work.
In fact, it is harder for idealists to make reasons why our intuition is not just perfect, why science does not just pour out of us logically complete, without effort. And they explain the distance in terms of indirection: Intuitions are compromised as they combine across individuals (a la Leibniz), or reflected off God (a la Berkeley), or diluted via 'participation' (a la Plato), or emanate into physical reality in a way that loses information (a la Kant), or ...
This is clearly a very cogent explanation of the success of abstraction and the basic approach of science via mathematical models, if one that has a hard time explaining anything else, or remaining internally consistent. It is the first reasonable philosophical explanation of this, going back to Plato, and explaining why earlier thinkers are defined in terms of him, being consigned to the category of 'pre-Socratic'.
It may be the only one: The real difficulty in explaining the success of abstraction is met only by empiricists and other physicalists. Hume is not wrong.
You can cast the success of intuition back on evolutionary theory, but explaining success with success is simply circular. And statistical/sociological theories from the philosophy of science, while vastly elucidating the process of succeeding, are not a solution. They do help convince us that sheer environmental adaptation "simply works" for mathematically sound reasons. But they ultimately do nothing to address the real difficulties any form of observation has with causality.