Can there be sense experience without phenomenological existence, in the Husserlian sense of the things themselves being given to consciousness?

Are they like something? Just as the smell of mint has its own qualitative aspect, is "like something"?

I am asking because, despite the apparent strangeness of it, I think that every time repeats its contents, including its sensuality. But the end (and beginning) of life is not phenomenologically apprehended.

  • 2
    Could you please illustrate your question with an example? What do you mean by "phenomenological" existence, what by "qualitative" existence? Thanks. – Jo Wehler Jan 21 '16 at 8:47
  • OK i tried. the former is difficult to exhaustively define and the latter difficult to communicate – user6917 Jan 21 '16 at 9:20

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