Williams (1973) casually asserts that
to believe that P is to believe that P is true.
He explains what he means by that:
To believe that so and so is one and the same as to believe that that thing is true.
Since the dual component view of belief is said to be the standard account of belief and it includes the view that
To believe that p is to believe that p is true. To believe ‘she is late’ is to believe that it is true that ‘she is late’. So if you recognise that p is false (you realise she is not late), you abandon your belief that p.
it would seem thus that Williams' position is the standard view.
On the other side, I found a passage in Kvanvig (2003):
 First, to believe p is not the same as to believe that p is true, even if we grant the logical equivalence of 'p' and 'p is true'. To hold otherwise is to hold that having the concept of truth is a precondition of thought, that no one can think or believe anything without having the concept of truth. […]
 The best thing that can be defended about the relationship between believing and believing the truth is that if a person believes p, has the concept of truth, and considers whether p is true, that person cannot believe p and fail to believe that p is true.
I interpret the difference in the following way: Williams holds that "to believe that p" equals "to believe that p is true", while Kvanvig
holds concedes the weaker view that "to believe that P" implies "to believe that P is true" (under certain premises).
I have the following questions:
Is there currently a consensus in the epistemology literature that "to believe that p" implies "to believe that "p" is true", i.e. the weaker position expressed by Kvanvig?
Has anybody argued against this weaker position?
Update: I enlarged my question to clarify it in response to the answers given so far.