Good overviews of the more recent history of analytic philosophy are Burge's Philosophy of Language and Mind: 1950-1990 and Philosophy of Mind: 1950-2000 (ch.20), the philosophy of science side in a very lively and polemical form is described in Zammito's Nice Derangement of Epistemes, "the best history of post-positivist philosophy and sociology of science we are likely ever to get", according to Giere's review.
That the linguistic turn has exhausted itself is generally shared. Burge writes:
"The philosophy of language became a vibrant, semi-autonomous discipline in the 1960s and early 1970s. In fact, it was considered by many to be the new "first philosophy... But by the late 1970s or early 1980s philosophy of language no longer seemed the obvious propaedeutic for dealing with central philosophical problems. As I have intimated, one ground for this shift was that many philosophers felt that philosophy of language had done its job that the natural development of philosophical reasoning led into the philosophy of mind, or other adjacent areas".
Zammito is even more critical of the impact of the linguistic turn on the philosophy of science, but he considers Quine's naturalized epistemology, cleared from his residual physicalism and behaviorism, a major positive advance.
"The story begins with the crisis of logical positivism/empiricism in the 1950s sparked by Quine's rebellion. The linguistic turn prompted two further impulses: the "historicization of reason" and the "social construction of knowledge... The "marriage" of the history and the philosophy of science has been rocky, and some would say it has ended in divorce... The displacement of philosophy of science into philosophy of language (in which Quine and Kuhn both represent major stages) proves, upon a consideration of this narrative, to have been less than illuminating for science, suggesting that the linguistic turn here has quickly run into a dead end".
Philosophies of mind and science remain vibrant. Sure, we do not live in the time of Kant and Hegel, but Unger's charge of "emptiness" targets Lewis, Putnam and Kripke. What about late Wittgenstein, Quine, Kuhn, Davidson, Dummett and Brandom, what about the Stanford Disunity Mafia (Nancy Cartwright, Hacking, Dupre, Suppes), the structuralist school in philosophy of science (Sellars, Sneed), or free will libertarians like Kane. In the wake of the linguistic turn there even emerged a new movement of duly humbled logical neo-neo-positivists, see their manifesto volume Logic, Epistemology, and the Unity of Science.
Quine's indeterminacy of translation fed into Kuhn's incommensurability of paradigms, that introduced history and social context into philosophy of science; Davidson gave one of the most penetrating analyses of mental vs. physical in recent times; Brandom launched an ambitious project of detailed grounding of semantics in communal practices. Dummett calls his project in Logical Basis of Metaphysics (1991) "anti-Wittgensteinian", and outlines the contours of post-linguistic analytic philosophy that directly addresses Unger's concerns:
"The layman or non-professional expects philosophers to answer deep questions of great import for an understanding of the world... if philosophy does not aim at answering such questions, it is worth nothing. Yet he finds most writing by philosophers of the analytical school disconcertingly remote from these concerns.
...analytical philosophy passed, comparatively recently, through a destructive phase; a few, indeed, have not yet emerged from it. During that phase, it appeared as though demolition was the principal legitimate task of philosophy. Now most of us believe once more that philosophy has a constructive task... In recent years, a number of analytical philosophers, prominent among them the late Gareth Evans, have rejected the assumption of the priority of language over thought and have attempted to explain thought independently of its expression and then to found an account of language upon such a prior philosophical theory of thought".