Source: p 272, Think: A Compelling Introduction to Philosophy (1 ed, 1999) by Simon Blackburn
[1.] It might be suggested that when we have a concern there must be something in the offing that we desire. If I am concerned to cut the grass, but do not want to do it, then if I do it, this must be because I do want something else: perhaps just peace of mind, for instance.
This introduces another very dangerous mistake, which is that of thinking that whenever a person has a concern, what she "really" desires is some state of herself, such as her own peace of mind.
[2.] Psychologists, especially, have been apt to think of desire in terms of a kind of build-up of tension, and what the agent is driven to do is to release the tension. It is then easy to think that the release of tension was the real object of desire all along. This too can introduce hurtful words: "You weren't really concerned about the starving children, you were just wanting to feel good." And all behaviour is diagnosed as fundamentally selfish, as though it is always your own state that concerns you, with other goals and aims a kind of mask.
[3.] This set of thoughts (sometimes called psychological egoism) is entirely wrong. [...]
I do not comprehend 3: why are 1 + 2 + 3 entirely wrong? The use of entirely in 4 appears too extreme and unconditional, because 1, 2 really constitute some (but NOT all) possible reasons for a desire (of respectively: peace of mind, catharsis of tension).