Often times the word 'awareness' is said to mean simply the having of an impression, or the state of knowing which terminates in the object known itself. So for example, the presence of the impression of a dog to my mind, in which I think 'there is a dog', is the embodiment of awareness. But can it be said that there is another sort of 'awareness' in which our knowledge doesn't terminate in the object itself insomuch as it terminates in the state of knowing? This sort of awareness would be represented by the sentence 'I think there is a dog'. Where one sort of statement bears in mind only the dog or impression itself, the other bears in mind a notion of the agent by which the dog is known; a sort of self-awareness brought on by self-reflection. There seems to be a necessary difference in that where the first can bear no relations since it terminates in the distinct impression, the latter can, and seems to give rise to such notions as truth and error which require the associative act of comparison.
Can there be said to be these two different senses of awareness, or is the latter merely an extension of the first, being identical to it in nature?