If humanity survives for a long time, then people today could have an extremely large number of descendants. Imagine that there are 100 drowning people, all of which happen to be infertile and one drowning young woman who is not infertile.
It is plausible that the woman could have a million descendants, where as the 100 people will obviously not have any descendants. Assuming that those people will live normal lives, clearly her life is far more valuable than the lives of the 100 people. This seems like a problem for utilitarianism.
Even ignoring the far future, it seems like there is an incredibly strong obligation under utilitarianism to have children. Having a child will presumable lead to about 80 normal years of life, a very good consequence. Murdering some random 40-year-old adult will only lead to a loss of about 40 life-years (plus maybe it might lead to some instrumental loss of utility, but this shouldn't be enough to get rid of the problem). Do utilitarians really think that having a child is a better action than murdering someone is a bad action, so it would be OK to murder a random person in order to have a child?
I think this is slightly different than the repugnant conclusion, though it is in the same vein.