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I see this in The God Delusion by Richard Dawkins:
If God is omniscient, he must already know how he is going to intervene to change the course of history using his omnipotence. But that means he can't change his mind about his intervention, which means he is not omnipotent.
Is this argument sound?
No, not really (practically speaking.)
The "validity" of a statement like this depends entirely on the assumptions and definitions (of "omnipotent", "omniscient", etc.) that are being used - both by the person making the statement, and by the audience.
Many read this statement and think Richard Dawkins has successfully refuted the Christian God*, but he has really only succeeded in refuting his own idea of God.
Christians* do not use the word "omnipotent" in the same way that Richard Dawkins uses the word.
Dawkins' assumes that if God "can't change his mind about his intervention, [then] he is not omnipotent" This claim comes from the belief that God must, by definition, be capable of doing anything (even changing His mind.)
When a Christian* claims that "God is omnipotent", their meaning is that God has the power to do whatever He wants to do. (See here.) This omnipotence does not necessitate the capacity for changing His mind, and does not preclude Him from knowing what He wants to do (and is going to do) "ahead of time".
So the outcome is:
Using Dawkins definitions, his claim is true
Using the Christian* definitions, Dawkins' claim is not true
Thus, Dawkins has not succeeded in refuting the Christian God*, but has succeeded in refuting his own idea of God (which is of very questionable value)
As a result, if a person were to use Dawkins' reasoning to try to refute the Christian idea of God, the reasoning would amount to a "strawman argument". Since the whole intent of such a claim is to refute the idea of God (including the Christian God*), and it falls short of doing so, the reasoning is not sound.
**NOTE: I am using Christianity and the Christian God as an example to illustrate the importance of defining terms and understanding a claim within the framework in which it is made. I understand Dawkins was not speaking solely in reference to the Christian God.*
There have been some who have suggested that God knows everything beforehand, so that while he can change his mind about things, he already knew that he wouldn't; i.e. he simply chooses not too. However, if you actually take the time to think about it, this doesn't really avoid the problem. The issue at hand is the conflict between foreknowledge and free will. If you "know the future", then that means the future is fixed in some manner. If you were even capable of acting in a way that deviated from that future (even if you didn't, but were capable of doing so), then that means you didn't "know the future" (the future is not fixed), because it could possibly change (even if it didn't actually change).
The problem with asserting inconsistencies like these (see also this closely related question) is not that they apply logic to a conception of God, but that they assume that God would have to exist confined within our physical dimensions.
Specifically, what reason is there to assume that God must exist trapped in the dimension of time as we are? Why would God have to view the world passing by in a strictly past-to-future sense? It is entirely viable to have God existing free from a constrained time, looking at the universe all at once (not just everywhere, but everywhen).
This is an absolutely physically valid suggestion, as time is just another dimension (albeit an unusual one to humans), and just as it is possible to look at all of the length, width, and breadth of an object at once for us, it makes sense for God to be able to see all the time of an object at once. A relevant point to bring up here is the theory that time is an "emergent property" of our view of a four dimensional universe. Similarly to when you move a three dimensional object through a two dimensional cross-cut (e.g. ultrasound), we may be viewing a four dimensional universe passing by along a three dimensional image we're limited to seeing.
What does this mean for the question? Well, if God exists free from time (that is, not traveling through it as we are, but able to observe it entirely), that means that no time passes from God's perspective. Naturally we cannot easily imagine this, but again, it is perfectly physically valid.
This idea implies that God's omniscience does not tell him what he "will" do (nor what he "has done" or "is doing"), but what is done, not in the past, present, or future, but as part of the existence of the universe itself. Simply put, no concept of time applies. Therefore, there is no contradiction involving him changing some future he already knows, because from his perspective there is no future.
This is an idea I've yet to see anywhere else (though it's very likely out there somewhere), but it is my solution to the question's perceived inconsistency.
The short, short answer I've always given:
I suppose that this does leave a number of things which God cannot do. For example, God cannot be late.
I will try to analyze this argument using proposition dependency.
Proposition dependency:
A proposition is constructed to understand realities (existences). Existences can be perceived by us because of their functionality, therefore nodes of a proposition exist as functions.
Anything that exists has functionality. There are two possibilities; dependence upon something else (A->B) or "not" dependence upon something else (A|B).
Therefore, a 'proposition' consists of nodes of functions that form a series of dependency
Terms:
The God Delusion by Richard Dawkins:
If God is omniscient, he must already know how he is going to intervene to change the course of history using his omnipotence.
- Dependency of Proposition: If God is omniscient, he (c1) -> must (cd1) -> already know (cd2) -> how he is going to (cd3) -> intervene (cd4) -> using his omnipotence (cd5) -> to change (cd6) - > something (cd7).
But that means he can't change his mind about his intervention
- Dependency of Proposition: But that means he (c1) -> can't change (cd6) | his mind (cd1) -> (cd2) -> about his intervention (cd3) -> (cd4)
which means he is not omnipotent.
- Dependency of Proposition: which means he (c1) is not | omnipotent (cd5).*
Reduction
Claim, (c1) | (cd5)
Conclusion: Proposition 1 and Proposition 2 do not contradict each other. However, the Claim is wrong because the Claim is inconsistent with Proposition 2.
Syllogism
First Analysis
G then Os (If God, then, there are functions of Omniscience)
Os then Kn (If Omniscience, then there is knowledge of how to intervene)
Therefore: G then Kn (If God, then there is knowledge of how to intervene)
G then Op (If God, then, there are functions of Omnipotence)
Op then Ch (If Omnipotence, then there is the ability to change something)
Therefore: G then Ch (If God, then, there is the ability to change something)
Second Analysis
Third Analysis
Conclusion: The First and Second Analyses do not contradict each other, but the Third Analysis has no relation to Second Analysis. The Third can't be derived (can't be concluded) from the Second.
Simplifying
First analysis
G -> Kn = (c1) -> (cd2) -> (cd3) -> cd4)
G -> Op = (c1) -> {(cd5)}
Second analysis
Third analysis
Conclusion: The Second Analysis is in line with First Analysis, but the Third Analysis is not in line with Second Analysis.
Regarding the argument used by Richard Dawkins:
"If God is omniscient, he must already know how he is going to intervene to change the course of history using his omnipotence. But that means he can't change his mind about his intervention, which means he is not omnipotent."
This argument is not asserting inconsistency between omniscience & omnipotence.
Please, refer to this: Dependency of Proposition, Omnipresence - Omniscience - Omnipotence, for further understanding.
There are a number of options available to the theologian who wants to refute Dawkins position. First, she can simply place God outside the rules of causality and grant God the ability to do things which look contradictory and impossible from the human position. This isn't actually particularly absurd, it simply places humanity in a position, like that of the shapes in Edwin Abbots Flatland, where something routine to a 'higher being' is practically inconceivable to us.
She can also grant the "many universes" hypothesis. In that case, everything that God considers happens. So somewhere there is a universe without humanity, and somewhere there is a universe where humanity is not destroyed by beings from Sirius III in 2050 because God sends them a horrible plague of rats. In that case, God can intervene back in time, forward in time, change his mind and intervene again... because everything just creates new timelines.
Of the two routes, I think that the first is the more compelling. It actually makes sense to say that you can't use human concepts of space, time, foreknowledge, and causality to meaningfully discuss the traits of a being that supposedly knows the precise position and velocity of every particle in the universe, since that knowledge alone violates everything we understand about space, time, causality and particles.
To clarify this answer somewhat, the problem with Dawkins' logic is that the premise actually denies the possibility of a logical conclusion. An omnipotent being is without limits by definition, so the imposition of logical limits on the being is a denial of the premise, not the conclusion.
The inconsistency of Christianity is not in the assertion of an omnipotent, omniscient being, it is with the insistence that such a being could be said to have motives or behavior that would be even remotely comprehensible to us. If we assume a god on that scale, the conversation must end there: we cannot divine that beings motives or desires or even say that it has any motives or desires that we would understand as such.
In other words, the problem with the Christian god is that Omnibenevolence is logically inconsistent with Omniscience and Omnipotence. An analogy that might be helpful is the idea of a computer programmer. Let us assume I write a game like the Sims in order to play it. The game is large enough that I can have multiple villages of sim creatures. I might encourage them to go to war with each other just because I want to see them go to war. I might give them competing religions just because I think its funny. I might do absolutely anything, for any reason.
To the Sim people, none of this would make any sense. In fact, from my point of view, a Sim lacks the capacity to even have things make sense or not make sense. From my point of view, a sim has no thoughts or feelings that I would recognize as such. They are just simple robots. And from their point of view (assuming they have a point of view), I am utterly beyond comprehension.
To a truly all powerful god, we would be simpler by far than a Sim. We would have less capacity for self direction, less capacity for self awareness, and less capacity for intellectual thought than a computer program. There is just no way for us to intuit the motives or desires of a being that is that much more powerful and intelligent than we are, and no reason to believe that such a being would ever give us directions that were to our own benefit in any way. God could be totally ethical from its own point of view and still lie to us constantly, because it just isn't unethical to lie to creatures who can't think or feel.
I will try to answer this from my own observations about Islam and arguments for/against God that I've heard in my time.
In Islam, and actually in Christianity as well, it is unfeasible to associate God with any human-born traits and qualities. We can only ascribe descriptors such as The Forgiving or the All-Seeing because they in no way relate to his actual existence or appearance. As such, I would first like to make the case that even statements such as Omnipotent and All Seeing are inherently flawed- human definitions cannot adequately rationalize or describe that which cannot be described.
Secondly, God exists in his own little sphere, outside of the rules of logic. This means that, even if omnipotence and omniscience are contradictory to us, God should have no trouble unifying these two concepts outside the realm of were logic and coherence actually exists. Remember, if God created all things, then logic and structure were probably one of them.
To quote from The Definition of God is Consistent?
"If you want to call this consistent or not is up to you. It is inconsistent as seen from a logical framework. But it is consistent with the standpoint that an omnipotent being by definition can do anything, including breaking the laws of logic."
I believe this question is fairly similar in structure and logic to, "Can God create a rock which He himself is not able to lift?" The answer is yes, because God is not bound to our rules.
Now, I cannot provide an adequate rationalization of what this kind of unison would look like. I would probably pick the multiverse theory; God can see into every possible future at every possible instant and the free will would come in deciding which possible branch of future he would like to commit to. Therefore, God knows every action that he could possibly make at any given moment, but still have the power to choose only a certain subset of futures.
Perhaps, I don't know. I'm agnostic btw.
This would be true if time were linear, but it is not, that is an illusion created by our brain to understand the sequence of events. Let me explain.
We live in a Quantum Universe. When a photon travels through space it travels as a wave of possibility. We use QM to deduce the highest possible place to find that photon. As soon as we observe the photon, the wave of possibility collapses to a single point we call a particle.
Time works much the same way, and why not? Einstein's space/time states the relationship between the two is inseparable. The future is a wave of infinite possibiliy. There are more probably futures than others, depending on almost countless circumstances. But when the future is actually observed, the wave collapses into a single point we call the Present.
God, being All-Knowing, knows where every single photon in the Universe is, and every possible path they may take. God, also being All-Powerful, could effect the Grand Equations and still know every possible timeline. This would also explain how we can have Free Will ( X Variables in the Grand Equation) and God is still able to retain His/Her/Its Omnicience status.”
This of course boils down to definition of omnipotence and omniscence - especially omniscence assuming inherent possession of all knowledge, understood and readily available. Of course that creates all kinds of problems.
But let's take a mind experiment: You are in possession of a device that can fulfill any of your wishes and answer any of your questions. Technically, through this you are omniscent and omnipotent.
Still, you are limited through your knowledge what questions to ask and what wishes to make. You don't know the future unless you specifically ask about it.
You wish to have memory of all events future and past, and so the device makes it so, but still you need to consciously focus on a memory to recall it. You do know everything, but you don't know everything at the same moment!
Eventually, through wishes that expand your potential of imagination you are able to transcend both the limitation of "memory access pipeline" and time and space - providing you choose to expand that far. You may very well stop at being able to see next evening and turn water into wine, and still be capable to expand beyond that and know everything, but never exploit that capability. So, while omnipotent and omniscent you remain a very humanly being with totally human limitations - self-imposed through your own choice.
Nah, omnipotence is about power to do something and not possibility. So omniscience means that God knows how He will do something and omnipotence means That thing will hapens because God has the power to do anything. Can God create a rock that is so heavy that even Him cant lift it? So here we are assuming that God can do anything, but if that is true then such rock doesn't exist. It doesn't make logical sense. If you are trying to disprove God's omnipotence by using logical arguments, you can't suppose that omnipotence can make 2+2=5 or a rock so heavy that even omnopotence can't lift when by definition, omnipptence can. Thats what i think. Thank you for reading.
If God is omniscient then God knows now that X will happen at future time t. Knowledge cannot be false. Therefore God does not now have the power to prevent X at t, else God could not know that X will happen at t. Power cannot falsify knowledge. In this case, then, omniscience sets limits to omnipotence.
The answer that I am going to give is "no." However, that answer requires a few points. First, omnipotent and omniscient each carry two meanings. While people often think of these two words as meaning "able to do anything" and "able to know everything," that is not always the case and many theologians have pointed this out. (Wikipedia will do for this)
In many belief systems, god is indeed omnipotent and omniscient, however only in the sense that god can do anything which is logically possible and can know only that which is reasonable. In other words, a god which knows all possible futures but is not able to know which future will be realized is still omnipotent and omniscient. If we accept these definitions, then there is no issue. Free will is completely possible: not even god knows which future will occur, just which ones can occur and probably the probability of each one occurring.
Problem of Evil
While not specifically about the problem of evil, your question does hit on it, and in order for the problem of evil to be an actual problem, among other things, we have to assume "strict" omnis. We have to assume that god can literally do anything and knows everything. But if we make that assumption, we are basically saying that god can be logically contradictory, and if we throw out logical consistency as a requirement for reality, then the problem of evil falls apart anyway: proof by contradiction does not work in an axiomatic system which is logically inconsistent, except in subsets which are logically consistent. (Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy)
