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In the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, the section 6.53 may be treated as "a criticism of Schopenhauer's Will". As far as I understood there is also another concept involved: the russellian idea that there is no mistery: the mystic is not a mistery in the sense of an object of a revelation.

  • Which is the correlation of these two arguments and in which sense Wittgenstein criticizes Schopenhauer's will?
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    Foe W and Schopenhauer, see Alfred Nordmann, Wittgenstein's Tractatus: An Introduction (2005): Index of names: Schopenhauer.
    – Mauro ALLEGRANZA
    Mar 4, 2016 at 18:43
  • What is your ref to "the russellian idea that there is no mistery" ?
    – Mauro ALLEGRANZA
    Mar 4, 2016 at 18:44
  • Here is 6.53, but what does it have to do with will or mystery? "The right method of philosophy would be this: To say nothing except what can be said, i.e. the propositions of natural science, i.e. something that has nothing to do with philosophy: and then always, when someone else wished to say something metaphysical, to demonstrate to him that he had given no meaning to certain signs in his propositions. This method would be unsatisfying to the other -- he would not have the feeling that we were teaching him philosophy -- but it would be the only strictly correct method".
    – Conifold
    Mar 4, 2016 at 18:50
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    Russell's Mysticism and Logic ?
    – Mauro ALLEGRANZA
    Mar 4, 2016 at 19:12
  • What are you quoting from the claim that this a critique of Schopenhauer or is that your own original idea?
    – virmaior
    Mar 5, 2016 at 15:01

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Bryan Magee, The Philosophy of Schopenhauer (1997) has Ch.14 dedicated to: Schopenhauer's Influence on Wittgenstein.

[page 310] This influence can be asserted with absolute certainty; it is clear in the notebooks, and Wittgenstein himself stated in conversation that when he was young he believed Schopenhauer to have been fundamentally right [...].

This influence seems qalso present into 5.62-63, with the critique of solipsism:

5.6 The limits of my language mean the limits of my world.

5.62 This remark provides the key to the problem, how much truth there is in solipsism.

For what the solipsist means is quite correct; only it cannot be said, but makes itself manifest.

The world is my world: this is manifest in the fact that the limits of language (of that language which alone I understand) mean the limits of my world.

5.63 I am my world. (The microcosm.)

5.631 There is no such thing as the subject that thinks or entertains ideas.

If I wrote a book called The World as I found it, [...]

5.632 The subject does not belong to the world: rather, it is a limit of the world.

5.64 Here it can be seen that solipsism, when its implications are followed out strictly, coincides with pure realism.

Compare:

6.373 The world is independent of my will.

with Schopenhauer's first sentence of The World as Will and Idea :

"The world is my idea".

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