Why "philosophy never ends" for the tractarian Wittgenstein?

Question

In the Prototractatus Wittgenstein wrote an additional section (called 6.55) which is seen as a possible third solution to the matter of building a perfect system of logic.

This conclusion was similar to that provided by Russell in his introduction to the Tractatus, i.e. admitting a hierarchization of languages speaking about each other (which is, in turn, a prefiguration of Tarsky's difference between language and metalanguage, as well as an application of Russell's theory of type to the field of language).

In the Tractatus this metalinguistic solution is eliminated because, according to its syntax and semantics, I only have one logic, one language, therefore all propositions are the same (for the same reason the possibility of having an infinite number of languages is eliminated as well).

With regard to this observations, I wonder ->

• in which sense in the Tractatus "Philosophy never ends"?

(Firstly, I cannot grasp in which sense this assumption is connected with the observations above; secondly, I wonder if there are other additional explanations which justify it)

Answer 1

in which sense in the Tractatus "Philosophy never ends"?

Why ?

6.5 When the answer cannot be put into words, neither can the question be put into words.

The riddle does not exist.

If a question can be framed at all, it is also possible to answer it.

6.52 We feel that even when all possible scientific questions have been answered, the problems of life remain completely untouched. Of course there are then no questions left, and this itself is the answer.

6.522 There are, indeed, things that cannot be put into words. They make themselves manifest. They are what is mystical.

Thus, when all the questions have been answered, what remains "cannot be put into words".

But where there is no language, there is no argument, and thus also no philosophy at all. Only the mystical.