In my limited reading of Kant I feel somewhat stumped by his apparently reductive individualism.
Kant is extremely sensitive to social issues on many matters, and he was writing at a time when Smith, Mandeville, Rousseau, and many others had identified "society" as more than the sum of its parts. After Kant, Herder, Hegel, at al., would, of course, reintroduce social mediation and a form of historical "reason" that is not simply instantiated in individuals.
Yet in such concepts as the categorical imperative or the kingdom of ends, Kant appears to leap between the "individual" subject and "universal" subjectivity with nothing in between.The "ends" of individuals, society, and species seem more or less continuous and unified, and "reason" appears the same for the individual, society, and humanity. Insofar as it is governed by reason, society is just the sum of its parts.
I understand that Kant is often accused of excessive "universalism," but it now strikes me as somehow an unwarranted leap or uncharacteristic lacuna within Kant's own system, and I suspect that I'm simply missing big chunks. Where does Kant deal most explicitly with "society" and what sort of ontological status does it assume in his work? Does he ever differentiate any sort of collective faculty of will or judgment?