Hume's Fork, which divides knowledge into 'relations of ideas' and 'matters of fact' has had an incredible influence on philosophy ever since its conception (though it is sometimes claimed that others before Hume, such as Leibniz, anticipated a version of the thesis). So influential is the thesis that it seems to have been a rather potent presumption in the minds of modern philosophers throughout time.
For example, Hume's criticism of induction and the wedge he placed between what experience offers us and what we conclude about said experience was incorporated by Kant, who was a critic of Hume in many senses of the word. That same wedge could be argued to be a driving presumption in Kant's understandings of the terms apriori, aposteriori, analytic, and synthetic (even if Kant's famous synthetic apriori was a response to Hume's seeming attack upon the possibility of science).
In more contemporary philosophy, such as in the works of Carnap, it is held that statements are either true by virtue of their form alone or are empirical statements.
To what degree is Hume's Fork, in some sort of manifestation or another, present in philosophy in the analytical community (especially in the works of Wittgenstein, Ayer, Carnap and Quine)?