Quine held that the meaning of words was indeterminate. The reasons he holds this view all seem to have in common a certain aspect; the indeterminacy that occurs occurs within what might be called 'material' modes.
For example, it is held that there is an indeterminacy in the reference of our words because the words of a sentence can be rearranged in such a way as to refer to something different than was previously, but despite this the original meaning of the sentence can nevertheless be maintained. This shows that the relation between the reference of our words and the meaning of the words therein is ambiguous.
While this is true, it is also clear that the ambiguity exists predominantly from a certain view, namely a view that considers the words and their manner of reference to be the determining factor of clarity in speech. What Quine's analysis shows then is that insofar as we view words themselves to be the standard of meaning, meaning is indeterminate.
What Quine's analysis does not show is that we should hold words to be the standard of meaning. We could just as well insist that since meaning just is determinate, meaning cannot be wholly material. Indeed, this is precisely the consensus of the Aristotelian-Thomistic tradition, which long ago realized that the material, consistently changing stream of our experience was in itself incommunicable (requiring the power of rationality to abstract more universal natures from the said individual experience).
As thomist Robert W. Schmidt writes in his "Domain of Logic According to Saint Thomas Aquinas", "The object proportioned to the nature of our intellect is thus seen to be the truth of material and sensible things, which by reason of their materiality are not knowable as they exist. They can become intelligible only by abstraction from that materiality."
So the question is as follows: What is to stop someone from viewing Quine's indeterminacy of translation as proof that the materialistic behaviorism which compels the equation of meaning and belief with words and sentences is insufficient to properly account for determinate meaning? Furthermore, what is to stop someone from, with the Aristotelian-Thomist, holding that the fact that materiality is unknowable, incommunicable, and indeterminate is reason to make a distinction between our individuating 'sense knowledge' and our more determinate and communicable 'cognitive knowledge', which is the true subject-matter of logic?