Do we believe that the Sun will rise tomorrow because we are logically compelled? I think not. Sure, our belief is more logical than in the centuries past with all that knowledge of dynamics and gravity, but ancient Egyptians believed it no less, and all they had to go on was practical reliance on what Hume called "the uniformity of nature". And in the end our knowledge of dynamics and gravity relies on that same thing. I submit that people rarely believe something for logical reasons, and never for logical reasons alone. Even in mathematics most people now believe the Poincare conjecture not because they inspected Perelman's proof, but because they pragmatically trust a few experts that scrutinized it for three years and delivered a positive verdict. And even the said experts relied on their practical ability to check complex and convoluted deductive chains without slipping up. Mere practicality is certainly not enough for certitude, it even involves taking gambles on plausible guesses, but thorough practicality is where certitude is rooted all the same. Logical reasons are man made rafts kept afloat by the pragmatic sea, and its water better be ground enough, for we have no other. As Quine punned, "the Humean predicament is the human predicament".
But let me address the Question behind the question directly. Classical metaphysics (Platonic, Aristotelian, Thomist, Leibnizian, etc.) postulated A, B and C as grounds, and proceeded to explain the world as intelligible and orderly based on them. It even described how we come to have the beliefs that we have, and why some of them carry certitude. But our confidence in that is only as good as our confidence in A, B and C, or as Kiblinger puts it describing C.S. Peirce's response:
"The only difference is that in this case the facts are all given up front at once — a bitter pill that can be swallowed and then forgotten only at the expense of self-delusion".
The patient was bound to refuse her medicine at some point, and metaphysicists hastened the deed by inserting their certainties into places that plainly could not bear them.
It is rarely noted that the father of pragmatism was an idealist, and an evolutionary metaphysical idealist at that. Here is Peirce in his own words:
"My philosophy resuscitates Hegel, though in a strange costume... Hegel discovered that the universe is everywhere permeated with continuous growth (for that, and nothing else, is the ‘Secret of Hegel’)".
This sounds odd, how is pragmatism a resuscitation of Hegel, even in a "strange costume"? Well, Hegel stood at the threshold between the classical and modern metaphysics. In place of firm A, B and C he put a historical progression of "determinations", but his determinations still unfolded according to firm laws of necessity. But if determinations can change what is there to keep them necessary? Peirce replaced the laws of necessity by evolving "laws of habit", a nod to Mill, and through him, of course, to Hume.
Hume left metaphysics no ground to stand on, Hegel put it back in but let it move. Pragmatism can not deliver absolute certainties, but then again, it can always revise what it got wrong. What seemed like an unholy union of Hume and Hegel turned out to be the saving grace.