Every justificationist theory of knowledge has axioms and premises that it begins with. This fact has led skeptics to criticize the possibility of knowledge by noting the infinite regress within any attempt at a proof. But this skeptical problem has been offered an answer in Aristotelian and medieval theories of knowledge; there are self-evident truths. It is here that the explanatory regress of verification stops.
Now this answer is often criticized for being either 'dogmatic' or for creating a distinction between two sorts of statements, a distinction that might seem contradictory to what can be said of our statements in their proper context. That is, there is made a distinction between statements that require verification and statements that don't, between statements known 'in virtue of their meaning' and statements known in virtue of some experience.
Overlooking the discussion that has raged on about what such a distinction would imply and whether it actually exists, one might focus on another question: would these self-evident principles really not bear any information whatsoever, being only meaningless tautologies?