Chalmers runs a (semi-serious) site Zombies on the Web with lots of (serious) references, where he makes a 3-way distinction:
Hollywood zombies. These are found in zombie B-movies...
Haitian zombies. These are found in the voodoo (or vodou) tradition in Haiti. Their defining feature seems to be that they lack free will, and perhaps lack a soul...
Philosophical zombies. These are found in philosophical articles on consciousness. Their defining features is that they lack conscious experience, but are behaviorally (and often physically) identical to normal humans.
...One might make the case that philosophical and Hollywood zombies lack free will and are thus a sort of Haitian zombie, although both claims would be controversial. In any case, many believe that Hollywood zombies are a sort of corruption of Haitian zombies.
Free will can manifest without consciousness on modern understanding of volition in both compatibilist (with determinism) and libertarian (without determinism) accounts. This attitude is relatively new however, and motivated by the rise of the philosophy of the unconscious, first in the works of Schopenhauer, Hartmann and Nietzsche, and later in Freud's psychoanalysis; Wittgensteinian and Heideggerian critiques of the rationalist view of action (the rule-following regress and the "embodied-embedded" approach); and recent neuroscience experiments (e.g. Libet's), which showed that people often can not accurately time formation of their "intentions", or even "fill them in" after the fact. See the review How Does Neuroscience Affect Our Conception of Volition? by Roskies.
In hindsight, it seems implausible that every letter in a voluntarily said sentence is separately "willed", and therefore that exercise of will requires awareness. But traditionally it was a very common philosophical position, aligned with "common sense", which is still implicitly or explicitly held by many rationalist philosophers and scientists (including Libet himself). In modern accounts conscious and unconscious wills are usually explicitly distinguished.
To summarize, unless one makes a question begging definition that free will is conscious will there is no logical connection between will and consciousness in either direction. Compatibilists describe how deterministic creatures can be conscious, and anti-conceptualists describe how non-conscious creatures can will. For more discussion and references see What counters are there to Spinoza's argument that acts of free will create infinite regress?