Melamed and Lin contend that for Leibniz,
Leibniz thinks that space and time cannot be substances or anything else absolute and must ultimately be a system of relations that obtain between bodies. (e.g., LC, L, 3.5) This is because if space, for example, were absolute, then there would be space points and such points would be indiscernible from one another. God would treat these space points differently from each other insofar as he orients his creation in space one way rather than another. This would have to be an arbitrary decision for the reasons outlined above. So, space and time are not absolute (SEP entry on Sufficient Reason).
Is this compatible with Leibniz's Identity of Indiscernibles? Doesn't this contradict the existence of indiscernible Space Points?
More importantly, aren't these Space Points are by definition distinct since they are different Points of the Absolute Space, so being treated differently would not contradict the Principle of Sufficient Reason since they are actually inherently different.
Am I misunderstanding something?